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Policy Research Working Paper 5917
This paper looks into institutional and other macro 
determinants of prevalence of informal dependent 
employment, as well as informal self-employment, in 
European countries, using European Social Survey data 
on work without legal contract in on 30 countries, 
covering years 2004–2009. Consistently with theoretical 
predictions, quality of business environment has a 
significant negative impact on prevalence of both types 
of informal employment. The share of non-contracted 
employees is negatively affected by perceived quality of 
public services and positively related to economic growth. 
Informal self-employment is positively related to growth 
in Europe at large, as well as in Eastern and Southern 
Europe. The level of GDP per capita also has a positive 
impact on the prevalence of informal employment 
in Europe at large and within Eastern and Southern 
Europe, whilst an opposite effect is found in Western 
and Northern Europe. Other things equal, the share 
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of non-contracted employees in the labor force across 
European countries increases with the minimum-to-
average wage ratio, with union density, with the share of 
first and second generation immigrants, and with income 
inequality, but falls with stricter employment protection 
legislation (EPL) and higher tax wedge on labor. Thus it 
appears that in Europe at large, labor cost effects of EPL 
and taxes are weaker than their impact via perceptions of 
job security and law enforcement, along with tax morale 
and the income effect. Yet the EPL effect on informality 
is positive (i.e., cost-related) when either Eastern and 
Southern Europe or Western and Northern Europe are 
considered separately. Furthermore, within Western and 
Northern Europe, the minimum wage effect is negative, 
whilst within Eastern and Southern Europe, the union 
effect is negative; in both cases, we offer a supply side 
explanation.What Explains Prevalence of Informal Employment 
in European Countries: The Role of Labor Institutions, 
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   2 
Introduction 
   Paid work without legal contract is a phenomenon closely related to such fields of 
economic  and  social  studies  as  shadow  economy,  tax  evasion,  trust  in  and  efficiency  of 
institutions, labor demand and labor supply, self-employment, worker mobility, labor market 
flexibility, social exclusion, social security, and many others. Understanding determinants of 
the size of informal workforce is thus important both for policy making and for design of 
institutional  reforms.  Yet  research  in  this  field,  especially  in  European  context,  has  been 
limited due to lack of data.   
  This paper employs data from rounds 2-4 of ESS (European Social Survey, 2004-2009) 
to analyze institutional and other macro determinants of prevalence of informal dependent 
employment,  as  well  as  informal  self-employment,  across  30  European  countries.  The 
measures on prevalence of informal employment used in this paper are those from Hazans 
(2011a); they include 74 observations on 30 countries. Importantly, for most countries, our 
data cover the early stage of the economic crisis of 2008-2010; thus the impact of macro 
factors during different stages of economic cycle is accounted for in our analysis. 
  The paper aims to contribute to two strands of the literature. Firstly, many scholars have 
studied determinants of the size of informal economy and informal workforce (e.g., Johnson 
et al., 1997; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Friedman et al.,  2000; Djankov et al., 2003; Loayza 
et al., 2005; Schneider, 2005; Perry et al., 2007; Kucera  and  Roncolato, 2008; Bajada and 
Schneider, 2009; Loayza et al., 2009; OECD, 2009;  Torgler and Schneider, 2009;  Dreher et 
al., 2009; Dreher and Schneider, 2010; Schneider et al., 2010; Feld and Schneider, 2010; 
Fialova and O. Schneider, 2011).  Regarding informal employment, an apparent gap (which 
we are trying to fill) in this literature is lack of multi-country analysis for Europe based on 
direct survey data on work without legal contract rather than proxy measures of the size of 
informal dependent workforce
1. As a theoretical contribution, we provide arguments for the 
effects of many factors traditionally viewed as promoting informality to have a potential for a 
reversal. Accounting for joint determination of informal wage employment, informal self-
employment,  and  unemployment  is  another  distinctive  feature  of  our  analysis.  We  also 
provide  empirical  support  for  the  positive  impact  of  income  inequality  and  shares  of 
minorities and population with immigrant background on employment informality in Europe. 
  Secondly, there is a growing literature, following the seminal contribution by Layard et 
al. (1991), on the impact of institutions on labor market performance. We refer to Blanchard 
                                                 
1 Previous multi-country survey-based studies on undeclared work in Europe (Riedmann and Fischer, 2008; 
Williams  and Renooy, 2008; Feld and Schneider, 2010) have focused on undeclared activities and earnings 
rather than on informal employment relationship.   3 
(2006), Eichhorst et al. (2008), and Lehmann and Muravyev (2009) for extensive surveys of 
this literature. Some of the recent developments have been related to complementary policies 
and interaction between institutions (e.g., Belot and van Ours, 2001; Amable et al., 2007; 
Fiori et al., 2007; Bassanini and Duval, 2009; Lehmann and Muravyev, 2009); extending the 
empirical base and theoretical analysis of institutional framework to transition and developing 
countries (Boeri and Terrell, 2002; Heckman and Pagés, 2004; Svejnar, 2004; Eamets and 
Masso, 2004; Ederveen and Thissen, 2007; Hazans, 2007; Feldmann, 2009; Fialova and O. 
Schneider,  2009;  Behar,  2009;  Lehmann  and  Muravyev,  2009;  Muravyev,  2010,  among 
others); identifying differential impact of institutions on various demographic groups (e.g., 
Amable et al., 2007; Bertola et al., 2007; Hazans, 2007; Say, 2011); assessing labor market 
impact of product market and/or financial market regulations (Amable et al., 2007; Fiori et al., 
2007; Loayza et al., 2009; Fialova and O. Schneider, 2011, among others); and robustness 
checks  of  the  results  using  alternative  panel  data  methods  (e.g.,  Baccaro  and  Rei,  2005; 
Amable et al., 2007).  
  Most  contributions  in  this  body  of  the  literature  focus  on  unemployment  and/or 
inactivity and ignore informal employment. To our best knowledge, Fialova and O. Schneider 
(2011) is the only paper in this literature addressing the informal employment issue (using 
proxy measures) in a more or less complete institutional framework. With regards to this 
strand of the literature, our contributions include: amending institutional variables with the 
shares  of  minorities  and  population  with  immigrant  background;  identifying  a  significant 
interaction between union density and minimum wage level; finding region-specific product-
market-related factors which affect employment informality; and applying mixed-effects and 
other panel data estimators which have not been used in this field.  
  Motivated by different data patterns found in Eastern and Southern Europe vs. Western 
European and Nordic countries (see Figures 1-3), we have conducted analysis separately for 
these two country groups, as well as for Europe at large. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a simple multi-period 
model  in  which  agents  choose  (in  the  random  utility  maximization  framework)  between 
various labor market states (including formal and informal employment), and firms decide on 
optimal  mix  of  formal  and  informal  workers.  Theoretical  predictions  on  the  impact  of 
institutional and other macro factors on informal employment are derived and discussed in the 
context  of  previous  literature.  Section  2  outlines  econometric  methodology.  Section  3 
(respectively,  4)  describe  in  detail  the  model  specifications  and  results  for  Eastern  and 
Southern  (respectively,  Western  and  Northern)  Europe.  Results  for  Europe  at  large  are 
presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.     4 
1 Macro determinants of informal employment: Theoretical considerations 
 
  Consider a multi-period model
2 of an economy whose state is described by a vector z of 
macro  factors  related  to  the  income  level,  economic  growth,  fiscal  burden,  labor  market 
institutions, etc.; hereafter we omit the time subscript from notation of the values of both 
macro and micro level factors. The economy is populated by heterogeneous agents, each of 
whom  can  be  in  one  of  the  following  states:  (i)  Formal  employee  EF;  (ii)  Formal  self-
employed SEF; (iii) Informal self-employed SEI; (iv) Informal employee EI;  (v) Unemployed 
U; (vi) out of labor force O.
3  There are four types (k = 1, 2, 3, 4) of agents, with comparative 
advantage (see Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985) in formal dependent employment (k = 1),  formal or 
informal self-employment (k=2), informal dependent employment (k = 3),  and home production (k 
= 4).  The  type  depends  on  characteristics  like initiative, risk attitudes,  taste for autonomy, 
family status, etc.  At a given moment of time, expected life-time utility of a type k agent in 
state j  {EF, SEF, SEI, EI, U, O} is determined by the macro factors z, agent‘s accumulated 
wealth y  0 and a vector of other observable variables x describing agent‘s human capital, 
experience, and location: 
Uj = uj k(y, V) + j , V  =  xβj + zj          (1) 
where V is the present value of the best of the vacancies (including the present job if any) 
available for the agent in the state j,  βj and j are given [vector] parameters (state-specific 
returns to micro and macro factors
4), a = xβj  is the expected productivity (for j = EF, EI it 
can be seen as ‗productivity signal‘ observed by employers), ujk are given utility functions, 
and j  are random ‗errors‘. The role of the type is reflected by the following condition: 
 
usk (y, v) > ujk(y, v) for any y, v  0, j  s, if type k has a comparative advantage in state s    (2). 
  
  In the random utility maximization framework (McFadden, 1981), an agent chooses the 
state in which Uj = max. Of course the comparative advantage can be ‗beaten‘ by a sufficient 
                                                 
2 A continuous-time model, as in Bosch and Maloney (2010) and Nikolovova et al. (2010), are better suited for 
studies of flows between formal and informal sector, but for our purposes a discrete time model is sufficient  
3 We consider an employee to be formal if he/she  holds and employment contract, and informal  otherwise 
(secondary  jobs  are  ignored  in  this  model).  For  the  self-employed  one  can  apply  various  definitions  of 
(in)formality,  and  for  the  theoretical  model  it  does  not  matter;  see  Table  1  and  Section  2  for  operational 
definition used in the empirical part of this paper. 
4  In  this  paper,  the  model  serves  only  as  framework  for  discussion  of  effects  of  institutional  factors  on 
informality rates over time and across countries. No attempt is taken here to describe the model in its full 
generality.     5 
difference in xβ and/or z between labor market states, so that agents are not necessarily found 
in the states where they have advantage, and they might switch states over time.  
  The productive part of the economy consists of formal and informal enterprises (see 
ILO,  2003;  Hussmanns,  2004),  including  those  of  (formal  and  informal)  own-account 
workers.  A formal enterprise has a (firm-specific) production function Q = Af (K, L1, L2), 
where Q is output per period, K is the capital stock, L1 and  L2 – labor input of formal and 
informal workers
5, respectively, A – total factor productivity. Likewise, an informal enterprise 
has a production function Q = Ag(N, L2), where the capital stock is denoted by N to account 
for the different type of capital used by informal firms. Assuming for simplicity that firms are 



























  for an informal enterprise,  (3) 
 
where the MP‘s are the marginal products of respective inputs, the ME‘s are the marginal 
expenses for the given categories of formal and informal workers, whilst r1 and  r2 are the 
rental rates of the capital used by formal and informal firms. For informal workers MEL is, in 
most cases, just the wage rate, whilst for formal workers it exceeds wage rate and depends on 
taxes and regulations. It follows then from (3) that, given the values of macro factors z, there 
is a natural productivity threshold for an applicant to be accepted as a formal employee:  
         
j = EF   xβEF   a* = a*(z) > 0;                                                 (4) 
 
agents with xβEF < a* can only count on informal jobs or self-employment. Any increase in 
cost of formal labor will push a* upwards. Likewise, a reduction in cost of capital and/or in 
cost of informal labor will make the entry requirement a* for a formal job higher.  
There is also an entry barrier (credit constraint) to the formal self-employment in terms of 
financial capital: y  y*> 0 for j = SEF.      
   At  the  beginning  of  each  period,  every  enterprise  for  which  equality  (3)  has  been 
distorted during the previous period (due to changes in the capital stock, prices, regulations, 
and/or worker turnover), opens vacancies and/or fires some workers to restore (3).   
                                                 
5 Perry et al. (2007) for Latin America and Hazans (2011a) for Europe provide evidence that use of informal 
labor by formal enterprises is common. See also ILO (2003). However, L2 can of course be zero.  
6 To simplify notation, we assume that each firm employs no more than one type of formal labor and no more 
than one type of informal labor, and that market wage rate for the given type of informal workers is the same in 
formal and informal enterprises.   6 
  The literature (see e.g. Schneider and Enste, 2000; Loayza et al., 2005; Schneider, 2005; 
Perry et al., 2007; Oviedo et al., 2009; Torgler and Schneider, 2009; Schneider et al., 2010; 
Dreher and Schneider, 2010; Feld and Schneider, 2010; Fialova and O. Schneider, 2011) has 
identified  several  broad  (and  partly  overlapping)  groups  of  determinants  of  the  size  of 
informal economy in general and informal employment in particular: 
(A) Labor market institutions: 
(A1) Strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL), 
(A2) Presence and level of minimum wage, 
(A3) The influence of trade unions, 
(A4) The level of spending on active labor market measures, 
 (A5) Generosity of unemployment and social assistance benefits available to the                 
      unemployed and discouraged workers;  
(B) The fiscal burden in general and the tax wedge on labor in particular; 
(C) Other regulations associated with starting, running, and closing a formal business: 
entry, trade, financial markets, bankruptcy, and contract enforcement (product market 
regulations); 
 (D) The quality of the public goods and services (social security, health care, education, 
perceived fairness of the tax and benefit system, quality of regulatory framework, freedom 
from corruption, criminal law enforcement, etc.) 
 (E) Social norms, including tax morale; 
 (F) Income inequality;  
 (G) Presence of sizable population groups which are exposed to social exclusion or labor 
market discrimination (immigrants, minorities, etc.) 
  (H) The level of economic development.  
 
  Most  of  the  institutional  and  other  macro  factors  affect  informality  through  the 
country‘s  income  level  and/or  economic  growth.  The  relationship  between  the  income 
(economic development) level and informal employment is not straightforward.  A higher 
income level increases demand for both formal and informal labor (income or scale effect), 
but  also  shifts  the  demand  from  cheaper  informal  sector  products  and  services  to  more 
expensive formal sector options (substitution effect). On the supply side, higher income level 
translates into higher formal sector earnings and welfare benefits, thus reducing pressure on 
unemployed household members to accept informal jobs. The overall effect of the level of 
economic development is thus ambiguous, especially if one takes into account that the formal 
market  might  fail  to  supply  some  luxury  products  and  services.  Likewise,  the  effect  of   7 
economic growth (or business cycle) is ambiguous as well. On the supply side,  during a 
downturn workers are more likely to accept any job, including informal. On the demand side, 
the above mentioned substitution and scale effects, opposite to each other, are at work. During 
the  boom  periods,  the  time  constraint  might  be  another  important  consideration
7:  formal 
enterprises  might  find  the  formal  procedures  too  slow  when  they  need  to  react  to  fast 
developments in the product markets.     
  Perry et. al. (2007) argue that labor market institutions and labor taxation (see (A) and 
(B) above) work through three channels. First, institutions which tend to increase labor costs 
hamper job creation and enhance job destruction in the formal sector. Second, institutions and 
contributions which reduce take-home pay and/or worker time flexibility without providing a 
sufficient (from the worker  perspective) compensation, motivate voluntary opt out of the 
formal labor market. This channel is obviously interacting with other factors, such as the 
quality of the public goods, tax morale, and income inequality. Finally, rigid labor market 
institutions, through disincentives effects, have a long-term adverse impact on productivity 
and growth. In case of Latin American (LA) countries, Perry et. al. (2007) consider the latter 
channel to be pro-informal (like the first two channels), because they find informality in LA 
to be strongly negatively associated with the level of economic development. We argue that 
the scale effect which reduces the demand for formal labor might reduce the demand for 
informal labor  as  well.  Moreover,  recent  research on flows  between formal  and informal 
employment (Bosch and Maloney 2010;  see also Hazans  2011a:  Figure 3),  indicates that 
dependent  informal  employment  (defined  as  work  without  contract  rather  than  just  tax 
evasion) might also be pro-cyclical, so a priori the indirect effect of rigid institutions on level 
of informal employment is ambiguous.  
  Table 2 summarizes the predictions of our model with respect to the effects of above 
mentioned groups of factors (A) – (G) on the share of informal employment in the [extended] 
labor force. Many of these predictions, perhaps in a slightly different form, are found in the 
previous literature, but some are new. In particular, we provide arguments for the effects of 
many factors traditionally viewed as promoting informality to have a potential for a reversal. 
To avoid excess ambiguity, we assume that GDP level and growth are controlled (as it will be 
the case in our analysis), thus discussed above indirect (via income and growth) scale and 
substitution effects of institutions on informality can be omitted (except for the tax effects). It 
is worth noting that the table refers to the share of informal workers in the labor force rather 
than to their absolute number (or population share): the latter might slightly increase even 
when the former is falling; we consider such a development as a reduction of informality.   
                                                 
7 I thank Truman Packard for this insight.   8 
Table 2 Effects of Institutions and Other Macro Factors on the Share of Informal Employment 
in the Labor Force, assuming that GDP level and growth are controlled 
Employment protection legislation (EPL) 
(+) Demand side: A stricter EPL increases
2 1 L L ME ME  thus leading to  
(i) an increase in demand for informal labor from formal enterprises; (ii) an increase in motivation to become 
an informal rather than formal self-employed; (iii) an increase in motivation for formal enterprises to become 
informal; (iv) a higher  threshold for an applicant to be accepted as a formal employee. 
Indirectly, lower income level increases the demand for cheaper products and services provided by informal 
sector at the expense of their formal sector substitutes. 
(-/+) Supply side: Workers might perceive a stricter EPL as enhancing job security, which makes formal jobs 
more desirable thus reducing voluntary exit from the formal labor market; however, job security has an 
ambiguous effect on cost of formal labor, which can either increase due to better bargaining position of 
workers or decline if workers accept lower wages when EPL is stricter (Lindbeck and Snower, 1986; Booth 
and McCulloch, 1996). 
  Presence and level of minimum wage 
(+) Demand side: The same effects as for EPL. The effects might be weaker if and where the minimum wage 
is not binding, or if it is not enforced.  
(-) Supply side: A minimum wage which is substantially higher than earnings in the informal sector makes 
formal jobs more desirable. Moreover, an increase in minimum wage leads to larger flows from inactivity to 
seeking formal employment, thus reducing the informality base. 
The influence of trade unions 
(+) Demand side: Unrealistic union demands might increase
2 1 L L ME ME leading to the same effects as for 
EPL. Moreover, unions tend to push for stricter EPL, which might lead to higher informality, as argued above. 
(-) Demand side: Presence of trade union makes it more difficult for the firm management to engage in 
informal activities. 
(-) Supply side: By providing formal employees with a voice and influence in the workplace, unions might 
increase job satisfaction and make formal jobs more desirable; they may also enhance  the supply side effect of 
the EPL. 
Spending on active labor market measures 
(-) Demand side: ALMP coordinated with formal enterprises might reduce their hiring and training costs, thus 
facilitating  job  creation  in  the  formal  sector. 
2 1 L L ME ME might  become  lower  as  well,  thus  creating 
substitution effect in favor of formal jobs. 
(- /?) Supply side: To the extent ALMP increases outflows from unemployment to formal employment, ALMP 
spending are expected to reduce informality (in particular, by helping the unemployed to overcome the formal 
employability threshold, see (4)). The empirical evidence on the effect of ALMP on employability is, however, 
mixed and depends crucially on the design of the active measures (see Card et al., 2009). 
Generosity of unemployment and social assistance benefits 
(-) Supply side: A higher income provided during unemployment reduces pressure and willingness to accept 
informal job and ensures that the unemployed can afford a longer search for a good match in the formal labor 
market. Put other way, higher non-labor income reduces labor supply, and this applies to both formal and 
informal sector. 
(+) Supply side: Higher benefit and longer benefit duration tend to increase the duration of unemployment and 
hence the overall unemployment level. Assuming that an unemployed person is more likely to accept an 
informal job than his employed counterpart
8, this might increase the informality level. 
Product market regulation burden 
(+) Demand side: A larger regulatory burden hampers innovation and technological change, presents barriers 
to trade and in other ways reduces quantity and diversity of goods and services offered in the formal market. 
This creates possibilities for informal sector to step in thus stimulating the demand for informal labor. This 
substitution effect is likely to dominate if GDP level and growth are controlled. 
                                                 
8 The validity of such an assumption depends on the benefit replacement rate and duration, on perceived risk of 
being caught and sanctioned, and on whether the benefit recipients are engaged in activation measures on a 
regular basis. Fialova and O. Schneider (2011) also argue that the overall effect of spending on passive labor 
market measures is rather ambiguous. Whilst sharing this conclusion,  we do not accept their argument that 
higher  passive  LMP  spending  „might  strengthen  the  incentive  for  operating  informally  while  receiving 
unemployment benefits at the same time‖. If someone goes for this option, why should not he/she do the same 
under a lower benefit?   9 
The fiscal burden in general and the tax wedge on labor 
(+) Demand side: Higher fiscal burden increases relative price of formal labor as opposed to informal (as well 
as the marginal cost of production in general, but this is accounted for by controlling for GDP level and 
growth). Hence, the same substitution effects as for EPL are at work. 
(+) Supply side: A higher tax wedge increases the net income gain for a worker choosing informal 
employment as opposed to formal one with the same labor costs for employer. 
(+) Supply side: Higher tax rates, especially if combined with low trust in the social security system and 
perceived low quality of the public goods, increases motivation for tax evasion, thus further undermining the 
provision of public goods and strengthening motivation for working informally. 
(?) Demand and supply side: Higher tax rates reduce after-tax income level, which, as argued above (see also 
Andreoni et al., 1998), has an ambiguous effect on informality.  
(-) High taxes might signal state‘s ability to collect them and/or inherently higher tax morale in the country. 
  Quality of investment climate  
(-)  Demand  side:  Given  that  transnational  companies  are  large  and  usually  subject  to  thorough  auditing 
procedures, they are less likely to use informal labor than other formal enterprises. Hence, one should expect 
that better investment climate, through increased FDI, reduces the share of informal employment.  
(-) Supply side: Transnational companies, via higher wages and/or employee benefits, as well as better 
working conditions foster attractiveness of formal jobs.  
The quality of the public goods and services 
(-) Demand and supply side: Perceived high quality of public goods and efficiency of the state institutions lead 
to a higher tax morale and lower willingness to enter informal sector on both sides of the labor market. 
(-) Demand side: Higher quality of the public goods and services leaves less ‗supply gaps‘ to be filled by 
informal sector. 
(-) Demand side: A more efficient regulatory framework reduces incentives for tax evasion and makes it more 
difficult and more risky to go informal. 
Inflation and price controls 
(+) Demand side: Inflationary pressure on wages is likely stronger in formal sector, making a marginal unit of 
informal labor cheaper relatively to its formal substitute. In addition, price controls create incentives to avoid 
them via informal enterprises.  
(+) Supply side: Both inflation and price controls are likely to make population less happy, undermining trust 
in the government and tax morale. 
Social norms and tax morale 
It is well documented in the literature that public perception of acceptability of tax avoidance in general and 
informal employment in particular is an important determinant of the size of informal economy and the level 
of informal employment (see e.g. Hanousek and  Palda, 2003; Torgler  2007, 2010; Torgler  and Schneider 
2009; Schneider  et al. 2010; Torgler et al. 2010).   
Income inequality 
(+)  Supply  side:  Chong  and  Gradstein  (2007:  160)  argue  that  when  high  inequality  is  a  result  of  low 
institutional quality and state capture, poor individuals see „find it beneficial to move into the informal sector, 
where although less productive, they are able to fully retain their production output‖, and this leads to a 
positive relationship between inequality and informality. This also follows from our model, as poor individuals 
are more likely to fall below both the ‗productivity signal‘ threshold for formal employment and the income 
threshold for formal self-employment. Perry et al (2007: 239) argue that high income inequality creates a 
perception that the state is run in the interests of a narrow group; this, in turn, leads to lower tax morale and 
higher  informality.  They  also  argue  that  in  the  high  inequality  framework  „it  is  more  difficult  to  collect 
revenues in a fair and efficient way‖; hence the quality of state services is poor, and the middle class is not 
getting good value for the money paid in taxes, which further increases informality. 
                                               Vulnerable population groups  
(+)  Supply  side:  Immigrants,  minorities  and  other  vulnerable  groups  are  likely  to  be  ―less  aware  of 
employment protection regulations and less likely to claim their rights‖ (Say, 2011). For this reason, but also 
due  to  labor  market  barriers  they  likely  to  face  (see  Kahanec  and  Zaiceva,  2009;  Kahanec  et  al.,  2010; 
Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2011 and references therein), representatives of these groups are more likely to 
accept informal jobs; Diaz-Serrano (2010) and Hazans (2011a, 2011b) provide empirical evidence. Moreover, 
immigrants from high informality developing countries are likely to reproduce the kind of informal enterprises 
which are common in their home countries. Hence, a larger share of immigrant and/or minority population 
might lead to higher informality. It is fair to note, however, that this is not necessarily the case: an alternative 
scenario is ‗specialization‘, or segmented labor market, without an effect on the size of informal sector.  
   10 
2 Econometric methodology 
 
  The data at hand (see Table 1) are unbalanced short panel data. Our main focus is on 
informal  dependent  employment  (work  without  contracts).  However,  this  form  of 
employment relationship is just one among the alternatives to formal employment, along with 
informal self-employment, unemployment and discouragement
9. To account for the fact that 
all these alternatives are shaped by the same policies and economic circumstances, we start 
with seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimates (see Greene 2008: 254-269; the origin 
of the method is Zellner, 1962) of the institutional and other macro determinants of the shares 
of informal dependent employment and informal self-employment, as well as the total share 
of unemployed and discouraged workers in the [extended] labor force. We use the version of 
SUR developed by  Weesie (1999) and implemented in Stata suest procedure (StataCorp, 
2005) which applies cluster modification of White (1982) sandwich robust standard errors. In 
our case, errors are clustered on countries and are of course allowed to correlate across the 
three models. The estimated effects reflect variation of institutional and other macro factors 
both  within  and  between  countries.  Exogeneity  of  suspected  variables  (e.g.,  government 
effectiveness) is tested using 2-step GMM clustered IV estimates (Baum et al. 2007); in few 
cases when exogeneity is rejected, the respective variable is instrumented; see Annex 2 for 
details. 
  For determinants of informal dependent employment we present additional estimates of 
various panel-data models which allow either for a more general error correlation structure 
than our SUR estimates or for a more specific modeling of within-country error correlation; in 
addition, some of the models include country and/or region level random effects.   
  First, we use Prais-Winsten regressions (see Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993: 343-351; 
Beck and Katz, 1995), with errors corrected for country-level heteroscedasticity and country-
specific AR1 correlation
10.    
  Second, we apply multi-level mixed-effects linear models (see e.g. Greene,  2008: 233-
238; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008), with country level random effects and/or random 
coefficients;  errror  variance  is  estimated  separately  in  each  of  the  four  European  regions 
(North,  West,  East,  and South)
11.  These models  are fit  by restricted maximum  likelihood 
                                                 
9 See Notes to Table 1 for definitions. See Hazans (2011a) for more details and discussion. 
10 We have also estimated versions of Prais-Winsten regressions where errors are allowed to correlate across 
panels (countries) thus reflecting the common macro factors beyond those captured by GDP level and growth 
variables, but the AR1 correlation is assumed to be common rather than country-specific. These estimates are 
similar to but less accurate than those reported in the paper. 
11  Mixed-effects  models  allow  various  types  of  within-country  correlation  of  errors  eit.  The  mixed-effects 
models presented in this paper (unlike other models presented here) assume independent errors; these models 
provide  better  fit  than  otherwise  similar  (not  reported)  ones  with  region-specific  AR1  or  exchangeable   11 
method. The role of within variation is more pronounced in mixed-effects models than in 
other models used here. 
   Finallly,  we  use  population-averaged  panel-data  models  with  semi-robust  standard 
error‘s clustered on countries, where results are obtained by averaging country-level random 
effects across the sample (see Liang and Zeger, 1986; Zeger et al., 1988; StataCorp, 2005; 
Greene, 2008:188). Within-country error correlation is not restricted (unstructured) in most 
specifications, whilst in others all off-diagonal error correlations within panels are assumed 
equal.  These models are estimated by the generalized estimating equations (GEE) method.  
  Importantly, mixed-effects models and population-averaged models do not impose the 
restrictive assumption of the classic random-effects model that the random effects are not 
correlated  with  Xs;  moreover,  in  contrast  with  the  fixed-effects  models,  time-invariant 
variables are allowed (Greene, 2008)
12.  
   For  all  models,  we  provide  robustness  checks  by  varying  country  coverage  and 
explanatory variables. 
 
3 Macro determinants of informal employment in Eastern and Southern Europe 
 
  Table 3A presents seemingly unrelated regression estimates, with errors clustered on 
countries  (see  Section  2  for  details  and  references),  of  the  institutional  and  other  macro 
determinants of the shares of informal dependent employment and informal self-employment, 
as well as the total share of unemployed and discouraged workers in the [extended] labor 
force of Eastern and Southern European countries in 2004-2009. Countries covered include 
the  Czech  Republic,  Slovakia,  Poland,  Hungary,  Estonia,  Latvia,  Slovenia,  Bulgaria, 
Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. For all countries but Romania we 
have three or (in few cases) two observations, including one during the economic crisis period 
(late 2008 or 2009). 
  Table 3A presents two specifications: {1} = {[1a], [1b], [1c]} and {2} = {[2a], [2b], 
[2c]}. Both specifications include the following six explanatory variables (detailed definitions 
and sources of these and other explanatory variables are found in Annex 1): 
(i)  EPL_2: Employment protection legislation strictness (OECD, version 2);  
                                                                                                                                                         
correlation, whilst our short and unbalanced panels are not suited for more general correlation structures. Note, 
however,  that  mixed-effect  model  counterparts  of  the  idiosyncratic  errors  in  the  SUR  or  Prais-Winsten 
regressions are the ―overall residuals‖ which include the random effects and are correlated within panels even if 
eit   are independent. 
12 Another approach which combines these two advantages is Hausman and Taylor‘s estimator (see Greene, 
2008: 336-340), but it is more restrictive.   12 
(ii)  MIN_WAGE: minimum wage level (expressed as percentage of average wage in 
industry and services)
13; 
(iii)  GDP_PC: log GDP per capita in  PPP USD (annual average, lagged 1 year); 
(iv)  GROWTH:  Real GDP growth, y-o-y, quarterly data lagged 1 quarter; 
(v)  UNION: Union density, % of employees (survey-based, using ESS data)
14;   
(vi)  IMMIGR:  Share  of  population  with  immigrant  background:  first  generation 
immigrants and second generation immigrants (survey-based, using ESS data). 
In addition, specification {1} includes 
(vii)  RULE_LAW: the Rule-of-Law indicator (on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5) from the 
World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2010; World Bank, 2010).  
(viii)  TAX_WEDGE: Tax wedge for low wage earners (lagged 1 year). 
Specification {2}, instead of RULE_LAW and TAX_WEDGE, includes 
(ix)  GOV_EFFECT: The Government Effectiveness indicator (on a scale from -2.5 to 
2.5) from the World Governance Indicators (see Kaufmann et al. 2010; World 
Bank, 2010). 
(x)  INVEST_FREE: Investment Freedom – the Heritage Foundation (2010) index (on 
a 0 to 100 scale) which ―evaluates a variety of restrictions
15 typically imposed on 
investment‖; a higher score indicates less restrictions (more freedom);  
(xi)   TRADE_FREE:  Trade Freedom – the Heritage Foundation (2010) index (on a 0 
to 100 scale) which ―is a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-
tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and services”; a higher 
score indicates less barriers (more freedom). 
  Both  specifications  explain  about  80%  of  variation  in  the  prevalence  of  informal 
dependent  employment  and  slightly  more  than  a  half  of  variation  in  unemployment  and 
discouragement; in the case of the prevalence of informal self-employment, specification {1} 
explains 64% of variation, whilst specification {2} explains 79% (these R-squared are from 
underlying OLS regression). There are no cases of significant effects having opposite signs in 
                                                 
13 Note that this measure is likely to capture the employment-depressing effect of minimum wage better than the 
alternative which uses economy-wide average wage.   
14 Alternative specifications (available on request) which use union density lagged two years back (either from 
the previous ESS round, or from OECD database) give similar results, but with larger estimated mean squared 
errors. 
15 Labor market regulations are not included in this index, as they are covered by another Heritage index.   13 
the two specifications.  To sum up, both specifications do a fairly good job in explaining 
employment informality. Note that the models in Table 3A do not include country or time 
fixed effects.  
  Both specifications suggest that the minimum wage level, the strictness of employment 
protection legislation, and the level of GDP per capita have a positive and highly significant 
impact on the shares of both non-contracted employees and informal self-employed in the 
labor force
16. The proportion of population with immigrant background has such an impact 
only on the share of employees working without contracts. The effect of EPL and minimum 
wage  are  consistent  with  the  results  of  Fialova  and  O.  Schneider  (2011)  obtained  using 
different informality measures and different econometric methods. In addition to the level of 
economic development (captured by GDP), the economic growth also has a positive effect on 
employment  informality  (which  thus  appears  to  be  pro-cyclic  in  Eastern  and  Southern 
Europe), although this effect is significant only in specification {2}. Comparison with the 
theoretical predictions discussed earlier in this section and/or in Table 2 indicates that for the 
EPL  and  the  minimum  wage  the  demand  side  effects  prevail,  whilst  for  the  income  and 
growth, the scale effect dominates the hypothetical substitution of cheap informal goods and 
services by formal ones. 
  Furthermore, specifications [1a], [2a], [1b] and [2b] in Table 3A indicate that union 
density has a significant negative effect on employment informality (for dependent and self-
employment  alike),  suggesting  that  monitoring,  voice  and  job  security  factors  are  more 
important that the impact unions might have on labor costs.  In accordance with theoretical 
predictions, the quality of public services (the Government Effectiveness index), the quality 
of investment climate (the Investment Freedom index), and trade freedom all have a negative 
impact on informal dependent employment (specification [2a]); the investment freedom has 
also  a  negative  effect  on  informal  self-employment  (specification  [2b]),  whilst  the  trade 
freedom reduces unemployment and discouragement (specification [2c]).  
  The tax wedge also has an ―expected‖ (recall from Table 2 that theoretically the effect is 
ambiguous) positive effect on informal dependent employment (Table 3A, specification [1a]), 
although it is significant only at 10% level. Moreover, this variable does not contribute a lot to 
the model‘s explanatory power, whilst specification [2a] explains almost the same proportion 
(79% vs. 81%) of variation in the share of informal employees without accounting for any 
measure  of  the  tax  burden.  It  seems  that  the  tax  rates  are  not  of  primary  importance  in 
determining the level of informal employment in Eastern and Southern Europe.  
                                                 
16 It is worth noting that the minimum wage level is found to have an equally significant positive effect on 
unemployment/discouragement (Table 3, specifications [1c], [2c]).   14 
  The remaining variable in specification {1}, the Rule-of-Law index, which captures the 
tax morale, but also the perceived quality of the public services related to law and order, 
personal security and property rights, as well as the effectiveness of the fiscal system, as 
expected,  has  a  highly  significant  negative  effect  on  both  types  of  informal  employment 
(Table  3A,  specifications  [1a],  [1b]).    The  exact  interpretation  of  this  effect  is  difficult 
because this index is more heterogeneous by construction than the other indices used here 
(Government Effectiveness, Investment Freedom, and Trade Freedom), and the contribution 
of  each  of  the  many  index  components  is  not  identifiable.  Moreover,  among  many 
components  of  the  Rule-of-Law  index,  two  (perception  of  tax  evasion  and  perception  of 
effectiveness of the fiscal system) are endogenous with respect to the past values of the share 
of informal employment
17, thus adding some ―informality persistency‖ effect (similar to but 
weaker than if the model would include lagged values of dependent variables as explanatory). 
The  weight  of  these  components  in  the  overall  Rule-of-Law  index  is  however  so  small 
(between  than 0.02 and 0.05  for the countries  and  years in  question)  that,  plausibly, this 
variable can be dealt with as exogenous in the informal employment model. However, same 
unobserved factors might affect both the (actual and perceived) quality of governance and the 
levels of informal employment and unemployment in a country, hence both Rule-of-Law and  
Government Effectiveness might still be endogenous. We have tested this with 2-step GMM 
instrumental variable  estimates (Baum et al. 2007), and for Eastern and Southern Europe 
exogeneity was not rejected, with high enough p-values, in all six models reported in Table 
3A; Annex 2 provides discussion and details.  Moreover, for dependent informal employment, 
the  model  with  instrumented  Rule-of-Law  is  very  similar  to  model  {1a},  with  the  only 
exception that the coefficient on tax wedge is smaller and not significant. Hence we keep 
specification  {1}  as  is,  with  non-instrumented  contemporary  (to  account  for  an  almost 
immediate impact of tax morale on informality) Rule-of-Law. The results are similar (and 
available on request) if the lagged values of RULE_LAW are used for countries/years where 
ESS field work has started earlier than in September of respective year, although these models 
have lower R-squared; if RULE_LAW is lagged for all cases in the sample, the results are also 
similar but do not capture the tax wedge effect (and R-squared declines further). 
  However, as we focus on institutional factors rather than the persistency effect, our 
preferred specification is {2}, in which all variables can be treated as strictly exogenous or 
                                                 
17 We refer to past values here taking into account the time lag between field work of the country-specific 
surveys underlying WGI (for the items in question, these are the 
 and World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey, with field work performed early in 
the calendar year to which the data refers) and ESS surveys (in most cases, late in the year for Eastern and 
Southern European countries, see Table 1).   15 
predetermined.  In  what  follows,  we  refer  to  the  numerical  values  of  the  effects  in  this 
specification (qualitatively, they are broadly similar to the ones in specification {1}). 
  The results in Table 3A indicate that a unit increase in EPL index, other things equal, 
will raise the shares of dependent informal employment and informal self-employment by 
about  2  percentage  points  each,  other  things  equal.  An  increase  in  minimum  wage  level 
relative to average wage in industry and services by a one percentage point will raise the 
shares  of  dependent  informal  employment  and  informal  self-employment  by  at  least  0.3 
percentage points each, whilst the rate of unemployment and discouragement will go up by 
0.45 percentage points. A one percentage point increase in union density reduces informal 
dependent  (respectively,  self-)  employment  by  0.25  (respectively,  0.4)  percentage  points, 
other  things  equal.  Interestingly  enough,  these  effects  are  similar  in  size  but  opposite  in 
direction to the ones caused by a 10% increase in GDP per capita (at PPP). On the other hand, 
an increase in year-on-year real economic growth by a one percentage point pushes the shares 
of  dependent  informal  employment  and  informal  self-employment  up  by  0.13  and  0.15 
percentage points, respectively.  A one percentage point increase in the share of population 
with immigrant background will raise the share of dependent informal employment by 0.2 
percentage  points  and  reduce  the  unemployment/discouragement  rate  by  0.1  percentage 
points. 
  A unit increase in the Government Effectiveness (respectively, Investment Freedom;  
Trade Freedom) index results in a reduction of the share of dependent informal employment 
by 5.3 (respectively, 0.18; 0.07) percentage points, other things equal. 
  In order to compare the size of the effects different factors may realistically have on the 
employment informality rates, one can use the change in dependent variable caused by a 1 std. 
deviation change in x. These standardized coefficients are found in Table 9. For dependent 
informal  employment,  the  largest  in  absolute  value  are  the  effects  of  the  Government 
Effectiveness and Investment Freedom (about 3.1 percentage points each), followed closely 
by minimum wage, GDP per capita and union density (2.7, 2.6 and 2.6 percentage points, 
respectively),  followed  by  population  with  immigrant  background,  EPL  strictness  index, 
economic growth, and trade freedom (1.6, 1.0, 0.8 and 0.7 percentage points, respectively). 
  Model {2} in  Table 3B  is  similar to  model  {2} in  Table 3A, but  controls  also  for 
passive and active labor market spending; the samples exclude Russia and Ukraine due to data 
limitations.  Higher  unemployment  insurance  spending  (per  percentage  point  of 
unemployment)  seems  to  reduce  both  types  of  informal  employment  without  affecting 
unemployment significantly, while spending on active labor marker measures tends to reduce 
unemployment, but does not affect informality. Other results are qualitatively similar to those   16 
in  Table 3. However, after excluding two countries (6 observations) with moderate EPL, 
relatively  poor  governance,  low  taxes  and  high  informality,  the  EPL  effect  is  more 
pronounced,  the  impact  of  government  effectiveness  is  weaker  (yet  significant),  and  the 
positive impact of tax wedge on informality is more significant. Model {1} in Table 3B adds 
to the sample Italy (which does not have a nationwide minimum wage). The results suggest 
that the share of informal dependent employment in Italy‘s labor force (as of 2006) was by 
about 3 percentage points below the level predicted by the model for ―Italy with the average 
for Eastern and Southern Europe relative minimum wage level‖. 
  Table  4  focuses  on  the  dependent  informal  employment  and  presents  estimates  of 
various  panel-data  models,  providing  robustness  checks  by  varying  country  coverage  and 
explanatory  variables.  Specifications  [1]-[3]  are  from  Prais-Winsten  regressions  (see  e.g. 
Beck and Katz, 1995), with errors corrected for country-level heteroscedasticity and country-
specific AR1 correlation. Specification [4] is a multi-level mixed-effects linear model (see 
e.g. Greene,  2008: 233-238), with country-level random effects and random coefficients; 
errror  variance  is  estimated  separately  for  Eastern  and  Southern  Europe,  as  are    random 
coefficients  on  the  immigrant  population  variable.  Finallly,  specifications  [5]-[12]  are 
population-averaged panel-data models (see e.g. Zeger et al., 1988) with semi-robust standard 
error‘s clustered on countries, where results are obtained by averaging country-level random 
effects across the sample; within-country error correlation is not restricted (unstructured) in 
most of these specifications, whilst in models [5], [6], [10], and [11], in order to achieve 
convergence, all off-diagonal error correlations within panels are assumed equal. 
  Most specifications in Table 4 (like specification [2a] in Table 3A) control for [lagged 
one year] Government Effectiveness, whilst specifications [5], [6], and [11] include the Rule-
of-Law indicator (also lagged). In addition, specifications [7]-[12] control for various labor 
market policy indicators; models [7]-[10] control also for the level of income inequality (the 
Gini index) and the share of local born minority population (which replaces the share of 
population  with  immigrant  background  used  in  models  [1]-[6]).    Results  from  all  these 
specifications  confirm  (for the dependent  informal  employment)  discussed above findings 
from Table 3A regarding both direction and size of the effects. In what follows we discuss 
only additional findings from Table 4. 
  Model [1] drops the tax variable and includes two countries not covered in Table 3A: 
Israel (2008) and Lithuania (2009). The results are almost identical both to those in Table 3A 
and to those of model [2] in Table 4 (estimated by the same method), where these countries 
are again excluded. Models [3]-[5] are estimated by three different methods (see above) on 
the same sample and with the same variables as model [1a] in Table 3A, so these are pure   17 
robustness checks. The only difference worth noting is that in the mixed-effects model [4] 
most institutional and macro effects are somewhat smaller in size than in comparison models; 
this  is  because  country  level  random  effects  are  included.  This  model  also  finds  that 
unobserved factors have a larger impact on the size of informal employment in Southern 
Europe than in Eastern Europe. The mixed-effects model provides a much better fit than other 
models
18.  Models [2] and [3], which allow for country-specific error correlation, also have 
smaller MSE‘s than comparable models [1a], [2a] from Table 3A.   
  Model [6] includes implicit tax rate on labor (TAX_RATE) instead of the tax wedge; 
this variable appears to be more significant, although the size of the effect remains similar: a 
one percentage point increase in tax rate leads to a 0.2 percentage points higher share of 
dependent informal employment; this effects reaches 0.3 (respectively, 0.4) percentage points 
when  active  (respectively,  passive)  labor  market  measures  spending  is  controlled  as  well 
(models [7]-[10]). 
  Models [7] and [10] (respectively, [8] and [9]) control for (lagged one year) spending on 
active (respectively, passive) labor market measures (measured in % of GDP per percentage 
point  of  unemployment).  Both  types  of  measures  seem  to  reduce  informal  dependent 
employment in Eastern and Southern Europe: an increase in the above mentioned indicator by 
0.01 percentage point leads to a fall in the share of informal dependent employment by 0.7 
percentage  points  in  case  of  active  measures  and  by  0.4  percentage  points  for  passive 
measures. Note, however, that when the actual variability of these indicators is accounted for, 
the size of the effect is slightly larger for the passive measures (-2.1 percentage points per a 
one standard deviation change in spending) than for the active measures (-1.7 percentage 
points). Moreover, one has to take into account that the effect of active measures depends 
crucially on their design which differ substantially across countries and time (Card et al., 
2009).  Nevertheless,  the  estimated  negative  effect  of  active  labor  market  measures  on 
informality  is  consistent  with  the  theoretical  prediction  (see  Table  2)  that  ALMP  might 
facilitate job creation in formal enterprises by reducing their hiring and training costs, but also 
by helping the unemployed to overcome the formal employability threshold.  
  Passive  measures  are  more  comparable,  but  their  effect,  too,  depends  on  benefit 
replacement  rate  and  duration,  on  perceived  risk  of  being  caught  and  sanctioned  when 
working  informally,  and  on  whether  the  benefit  recipients  are  required  to  take  part  in 
activation measures on a regular basis. The estimated negative effect of passive labor market 
measures on informality is consistent with the idea that a higher income provided during 
                                                 
18 Note that the prediction of the mixed-effects model is defined as the sum of the fixed part linear prediction and 
the best linear unbiased prediction of the random part.    18 
unemployment reduces pressure and willingness to accept informal job and ensures that the 
unemployed can afford a longer search for a good match in the formal labor market (Table 2). 
However, Table 2 provides an argument for an opposite effect, too: Higher benefit and longer 
benefit  duration  tend  to  increase  the  duration  of  unemployment  and  hence  the  overall 
unemployment level. If an unemployed person is more likely to accept an informal job than 
his employed counterpart
19, this might increase the informality level. Indeed, models [11]-
[12]  find  that  the  effect  of  generosity  of  unemployment  and  social  assistance  benefits 
(measured by the average unemployment benefit and social assistance net replacement rate 
over 60 months of unemployment, %) on the informal employment is U-shaped, with the 
turning point at the net replacement rate of about 55%. 
  As Figure 3 (left panel) illustrates, the measures of active and passive LMP spending 
feature a rather strong positive correlation within our sample; this is why it is difficult to 
disentangle  the  effects  of  the  two  types  of  spending.  A  system  of  seemingly  unrelated 
estimates similar to specification {2} in Table 3A, which includes both types of spending 
along  with  other  variables  from  models  [9]-[10]  of  Table  4,  suggests  that  reduction  in 
unemployment is due to ALMP spending, but it is difficult to determine which of the two 
types of spending is more effective against informal employment – results in this respect are 
not robust against changing some of the explanatory variables or excluding some countries.  
  Consistent with theoretical prediction that vulnerable population groups are more likely 
to be pushed to informal employment (see Table 2 for the argument; empirical evidence is 
found in Diaz-Serrano, 2010; Hazans, 2011a, 2011b; Say, 2011), models [7]-[10] find a highly 
significant  positive  effect  of  the  share  of  local  born  minority  population  on  informal 
dependent employment. This effect is similar in size (and in nature) to the effect of the share 
of population with immigrant background: The standardized coefficient varies between 1.3 
and 1.6 percentage points per a one standard deviation change. 
  Finally, models [7]-[10] confirm also the prediction of Chong and Gradstein (2007: 
160) and Perry et al (2007: 239) that higher income inequality leads to higher informality in 
the labor market.  A one percentage point increase in the Gini index will raise the share of 
dependent informal employment by 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points; the effect is larger when 
passive  (rather  than  active)  labor  market  spending  is  controlled.  This  effect  seems  to  be 
causal: we have tested for reverse causality and found that informality does not Grange cause 
inequality.  
                                                 
19 Hazans (2011b) provides evidence that persons with a long-term unemployment experience are much more 
likely to hold informal salaried jobs, other things equal.   19 
  Most of our specifications exclude Italy, which does not have a nationwide minimum 
wage. As a robustness check, models [7] and [8] (like models [1a]-[1c] in Table 3B) assign to 
Italy a minimum wage at the level of 38.5% of the average wage in industry and services (the 
mean level for our sample of Eastern and Southern European countries) and include a dummy 
for Italy. The share of non-contracted employees in Italy‘s labor force (as of 2006) was by 8 
to  10  percentage  points  below  the  level  predicted  by  the  model  with  this  hypothetical 
minimum wage level (this effect of absence of a minimum wage is stronger than in Table 3B 
because this time the Gini index is controlled). 
 
4 Macro determinants of informal employment in Western and Northern Europe 
 
  Table 5 presents seemingly unrelated regressions estimating the institutional and other 
macro  determinants  of  the  shares  of  informal  dependent  employment  and  informal  self-
employment,  as  well  as  the  total  share  of  unemployed  and  discouraged  workers  in  the 
[extended] labor force of Western European and Nordic countries. Countries covered include 
the  UK,  Ireland,  Netherlands,  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Switzerland,  Austria,  Norway, 
Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. For most countries we have three observations which refer to 
2004-2005, 2006-2007, and 2008-2009 (see details in Table 1); for France, we miss the first 
of these biannual cycles, whilst for Austria we miss the last. Austria aside, the most recent 
data for each country come from a survey implemented during the economic crisis (late 2008 
and/or early 2009, except for Ireland where it was a year later). 
  With few exceptions, the explanatory variables are the same as for Eastern and Southern 
Europe.  The  Rule-of-Law  indicator  is  not  used  for  Western  and  Northern  Europe.  New 
variables (see Annex 1 for details) include: 
(i)  SAT_GOV – average satisfaction with the national government (on a 0 to 10 scale), 
from the respective round of the ESS (used only in specification{2}) 
(ii)  GOV_EXPsq – government expenditures (consumption and transfers) at all levels 
as percentage of GDP, squared /100 
20 
(iii)  BUS_FREE: Business Freedom – the Heritage Foundation (2010) index (on a 0 to 
100 scale) which measures „the ability to start, operate, and close a business‖ and 
is negatively related to the overall burden of regulation as well as to the efficiency 
of government in the regulatory process.  
                                                 
20 This variable is a simple transformation of the Heritage Foundation (2010) Government Spending index: the 
latter equals 100 – 3GOV_EXPsq; the transformation has been applied to facilitate interpretation of the results.   20 
(iv)  MON_FREE: Monetary Freedom – the Heritage Foundation (2010) index (on a 0 
to 100 scale) of price stability and absence of price controls. 
(v)  NO_MINWAGE = 1 if a country does not have a minimum wage, 0 otherwise. 
        
       Importantly, the models control for spending on labor market measures (expressed in 
% of GDP per percentage point of unemployment), which, due to data limitations, were not 
included in the baseline specifications (see Table 3A) for Eastern and Southern Europe.     
  Table 5 includes two specifications: {1} = {[1a], [1b], [1c]} has among the controls 
government effectiveness (GOV_EFFECT), whilst {2} = {[2a], [2b], [2c]} has satisfaction 
with  the  national  government  (SAT_GOV)  instead;  otherwise  the  two  specifications  are 
identical. Exogeneity  of GOV_EFFECT and SAT_GOV has been tested (see Annex 2 for 
details); it appears that  GOV_EFFECT is endogenous with respect to informal dependent 
employment, whilst SAT_GOV - with respect to unemployment (p-values of exogeneity tests 
are below 0.02). Therefore, in corresponding equations, GOV_EFFECT is instrumented with 
duration of ESS fieldwork in the country and the share of local-born minority population, 
whilst SAT_GOV – with mean trust in the police (both instruments refer to the respective ESS 
round). In remaining four equations, exogeneity is not rejected (p-values 0.30, 0.76, 0.82, and 
0.55).  
  The explanatory power of the models presented in Table 5 is superior to that of similar 
models for Eastern and Southern Europe presented in Table 3A and discussed above: This 
time, each model explains at least 90% of variation in dependent variable (these R-squared are 
from  underlying  OLS  regression);  specification  {1}  provides  a  slightly  better  fit  when 
explaining  prevalence  of  both  types  of  informal  employment.  The  results  from  the  two 
specifications are well in line with each other.  
   Both  specifications  suggest  that,  other  things  equal,  the  strictness  of  employment 
protection legislation has a positive and significant impact on the share of non-contracted 
employees
21, indicating that predicted demand side effects are stronger than potential impact 
of perceived security of formal jobs. This is similar to the situation found in Table 3A for 
Eastern and Southern Europe, yet in Western Europe and the Nordic countries the EPL seems 
to  be  less  fundamental  determinant  of  informality,  as  the  effect  disappears  when  either 
spending on labor market measures or the tax wedge is not controlled
22. Moreover, simple 
scatter-plots  feature  a  negative  correlation  between  EPL  and  informality  in  Western  and 
Northern Europe, whilst across countries of Eastern and Southern Europe this correlation is 
                                                 
21 There is a similar effect on unemployment and discouragement rate. 
22 These results are available on request.   21 
positive (Figure 1). Furthermore, in contrast with Eastern and Sothern Europe, the impact of 
EPL on informal self-employment in the West and in the North is negative (Table 5). 
  Consistently with theoretical predictions (see Table 2), the quality of public services 
(proxied  by  the  Government  Effectiveness  index  in  specification  {1}  and  by  average 
Satisfaction with the Government in specification {2} of Table 5), as well as the quality of 
business environment (Business Freedom in specification {1}) have a  negative impact on 
prevalence of both types of informal employment. Higher government expenditures relative to 
GDP reduce [both types of] informal employment, as well as unemployment, other things 
(including  government  effectiveness  or  satisfaction  with  the  government!)  equal.  These 
effects have of course a straightforward demand side explanation. 
  Monetary freedom is found to have a highly significant negative effect on the share of 
informal dependent employment (Table 5, specification [2a]). In other words, higher inflation 
and price controls push more employees into work without a contract
23. This effect might 
work through both demand and supply side mechanisms. On the demand side, inflationary 
pressure on wages is likely stronger in formal sector, which makes a marginal unit of informal 
labor cheaper relatively to its formal substitute (let aside the scale effect which we ignore 
because the GDP level and growth are controlled). In addition, price controls create incentives 
to avoid them via informal enterprises. On the supply side, both inflation and price controls 
are likely to make population less happy, undermining trust in the government and tax morale.     
  Contrary to ―conventional‖ predictions (see Table 2), the effect of the tax wedge for low 
wage earners  on  the  share  of  informal  dependent  employment  in  Western  and  Northern 
Europe is negative (and highly significant). This effect is not an artifact, because dropping the 
tax wedge variable reduces the R-squared of the underlying OLS model by more than 10 
percentage points (and adjusted R-squared by more than 15 points). The effect disappears (not 
becomes positive though) if six observations which refer to Ireland and the UK (countries 
with relatively low tax wedge and high share of informal employees) are removed from the 
sample. A possible explanation might be that the [unobserved component of] tax morale in 
these two countries is substantially lower than elsewhere in Western and Northern Europe, or 
enforcement is weaker.  We come back to this point in the next section. Another explanation 
for the negative impact of tax wedge on informality is related to the scale effect (discussed in 
detail in Section 2), as smaller tax burden results in higher after-tax income. 
  For those  countries  of  Western and Northern  Europe  where  a nationwide minimum 
wage exists (i.e., the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, with 14 observations 
                                                 
23 Schneider et al. (2010: Table A4.1) find a positive effect of inflation on the size of the shadow economy in 
transition countries (in 1994-2006) but not in high income OECD countries (1996-2007).   22 
in the sample), we find a negative and highly significant effect of the minimum wage level on 
the  share  of  informal  dependent  employment  (as  well  as  on  unemployment  and 
discouragement  rate);  the  effect  on  informal  self-employment  is  positive  but  rather  small 
(Table 5).   Comparison with the theoretical predictions (see Table 2) indicates that the supply 
side channels of the impact of minimum wage level (through relative attractiveness of formal 
jobs  and  through  labor  force  participation)  prevail.  Other  things  equal,  an  increase  in 
minimum wage level relative to average wage in industry and services by a one percentage 
point will reduce the share of dependent informal employment by 1.5 to 1.7 percentage points 
(Table 5, models [1a]-[2a]).  As Figure 2 (right panel) indicates, the effect is to a large extent 
driven by the UK and Ireland having much lower minimum wage levels and much higher 
shares of informal employees than the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. However, within-
countries slopes for UK and IE are also clearly negative. 
  On  the  other  hand,  in  countries  which  do  not  have  a  nationwide  minimum  wage 
(Germany,  Austria,  Switzerland,  Denmark,  Sweden,  Finland,  and  Norway),  the  share  of 
informal dependent  employment is, on average, by 2.5 percentage points below the level 
predicted  by  the  model  assuming  for  these  countries  the  average  for  Western  Europe 
minimum-to-average wage ratio of 42.4% (see Table 5, specification [1a]); Figure 2 shows an 
even larger gap when other factors are not controlled). This suggests that in the wealthy part 
of Europe, the demand side effects of minimum wage, as outlined in Table 2, work through 
existence of the institution as such rather than through its level: institutionalized minimum 
wage  raises  the  demand  for  informal  labor  from  formal  enterprises,  motivates  nascent 
entrepreneurs to enter informal rather than formal sector or to switch from formal to informal, 
and makes higher the threshold to be accepted as a formal employee. 
  As discussed in Section 2, the effect of the both level of economic development and 
economic  growth  (or  business  cycle)  on  the  employment  informality  is  theoretically 
ambiguous. Indeed, both specifications in Table 5 find that the share of informal dependent 
employment is positively (and highly significantly) related to economic growth (plausibly, 
through demand side channels - the scale effect and the time pressure), whilst GDP per capita 
has a negative impact on the prevalence of both types of informal employment (plausibly, 
through the substitution effect on the demand side and the non-labor income effect on the 
supply side).  Both income level and economic growth significantly reduce unemployment 
and discouragement, other things equal.   23 
  Union density in Western and Northern Europe (27% and 73%, respectively
24) is much 
higher than in Eastern and Southern Europe (21% in each case). Hence, one can expect a 
different impact of unions on informality. Indeed, specifications [1a], [2a], [1b] and [2b] in 
Table 5 indicate that union density has a significant positive effect on the shares of employees 
without contracts and informal self-employed: a 10 percentage points higher union density 
raises the proportions of the two types of informal workers by 0.9 and 0.3 percentage points, 
respectively.  A likely explanation is that union pressure makes formal labor more expensive 
relative  to  informal,  thus  increasing  demand  for  informal  labor  from  formal  enterprises, 
strengthening the motivation  for enterprises to become (or stay) informal, and raising the 
threshold  for  an  applicant  to  be  accepted  as  a  formal  employee.  On  the  other  hand, 
monitoring,  voice  and  job  security  factors  (see  Table  2)  seem  to  be  less  important. 
Furthermore,  models  [3a]  and  [3b]  (Table  5)  suggest  that  unions  tend  to  increase 
unemployment in Western and Northern Europe: an increase in union density by 9 percentage 
points will raise the share of unemployed and discouraged by 1 percentage point, other things 
equal.  
  In contrast with Eastern and Southern Europe, we do not find a significant impact of the 
share of population with immigrant background on the prevalence of informal employment 
(this is consistent with the results on individual level determinants of informality in Hazans, 
2011b).    
  Recall from Section 2 that in Eastern and Southern Europe, both active and passive 
labor market policy (ALMP and PLMP) spending were found to reduce informal dependent 
employment, but because of correlation between the two types of spending it was not clear 
whether any of these effects is causal. In Western and Northern Europe, ALMP and PLMP 
spending (per percentage point of unemployment) are also correlated (Figure 3, right; the 
correlation is less pronounced among Nordic countries). More importantly, in Western and 
Northern Europe the median level of both ALMP and PLMP spending relative to GDP is 
about four times higher than in Eastern and Southern Europe (Figure 3).  
  In  addition  to  LMP  spending,  our  models  include  also  the  average  unemployment 
benefit (UB) and social assistance (SA) total net replacement rate (in percent) over 60 months 
of unemployment (UBSA)
25. To avoid spurious effects when combining ALMP, PLMP and 
UBSA in each of the three equations of specifications {1} and {2}, we have kept the most 
significant of the three variables and added those which increased explanatory power and 
                                                 
24 Non-weighted average of country-specific rates. 
25 For Denmark, only the UB net replacement rate (at 66% to 68% for the period in question) was available. 
Given that maximum UB duration has been 5 years in 1998-2004, and 4 years in 2005-2008, this is a good 
enough proxy.     24 
improved  information  criteria,  ending  up  with  PLMP  and  UBSA  in  the  equation  for 
dependent informal employment, ALMP for informal self-employment, and both ALMP and 
PLMP for unemployment/discouragement (all three variables are lagged by one year). 
  The results in Table 5 (specifications [1a], [1b], [1c], [2c]) suggest that higher spending 
on  passive  labor  market  measures  (per  percentage  point  of  unemployment)  significantly 
increases both the unemployment/discouragement rate and the share of informal dependent 
employment, other things equal; the latter effect is likely to be the consequence of the former, 
which, in turn works through increasing duration of unemployment (see Table 2). An increase 
in PLMP spending per percentage point of unemployment by 0.1 percentage point of GDP
26 
will raise the share of informal dependent employment by about 2.5 percentage points, other 
things  equal.  On the other hand,  an increase in  the long-term  (over a 60 months  period) 
income  replacement  rate  for  unemployed  by  one  percentage  point  reduces  the  share  of 
informal dependent employment by 0.5 percentage points (part of the latter effect will of 
course offset the former, but social assistance spending is not included in PLMP). This is in 
line with Bajada and Schneider (2009), who argue that reducing replacement rates would not 
only leave without adequate support those unemployed experiencing financial hardship, but it 
is  likely  to  have  little  impact  on  reducing  participation  by  the  unemployed  in  shadow 
economy. The co-existence of the two above-mentioned opposite effects is consistent with 
theoretical ambiguity (presented in Table 2) of the impact of generosity of the benefit system 
on  the  prevalence  of  informal  employment  (recall  that  a  higher  income  provided  during 
unemployment reduces pressure and willingness to accept informal job and ensures that the 
unemployed can afford a longer search for a good match in the formal labor market). From 
the policy choice standpoint, a further study to disentangle the effects of coverage, duration, 
and  generosity  of  unemployment  insurance  and  social  assistance  benefits  on  informal 
employment is called for. 
  ALMP spending significantly reduces both the share of informal self-employment and 
the unemployment/discouragement rate. As discussed in Table 2, ALMP coordinated with 
formal  enterprises  likely  reduces  their  hiring  and  training  costs,  creating  both  scale  and 
substitution effects in favor of formal jobs; moreover, ALMP might help the unemployed to 
overcome the formal employability threshold.    An  increase  in  the  ALMP  spending  per 
percentage point of unemployment by 0.1 percentage point of GDP leads to a fall in the share 
of informal self-employment by 0.7 percentage points, other things equal.  
                                                 
26 In our sample, PLMP (respectively, ALMP) varies between 0.03% and 0.49% (respectively, between 0.06% 
and 0.34%) of GDP per percentage point of unemployment (see Figure 3, right).   25 
  To make the effects of various types of spending comparable, one can use standardized 
coefficients (see Table 9) which suggest that in Western and Northern Europe, a one standard 
deviation change in ALMP spending reduces informal self-employment by 0.5 percentage 
points (whilst the share of unemployed and discouraged is cut by about 2 percentage points). 
On the other hand, a one standard deviation increase in PLMP spending raises the share of 
non-contracted employees by 3 percentage points and the unemployment/discouragement rate 
by  about  2  percentage  points.  Finally,  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  the  average 
unemployment benefit and social assistance total net replacement rate over 60 months of 
unemployment reduces the share of non-contracted employees by about 3 percentage points. 
When interpreting these findings one should of course keep in mind that the three types of 
spending rarely change independently of each other. 
  Table 6 (models [1]-[3]) provide alternative panel-data estimates for determinants of the 
share of employees without contracts in the labor force of Western and Northern European 
countries; the explanatory variables are the same as for model [1a] in Table 5. Model [2], in 
which  the  estimates  are  obtained  by  averaging  country-level  random  effects  (possibly 
correlated with the Xs) across population, confirms all results from model [1a] in Table 5 both 
qualitatively and in terms of the size of the effects, but ensures a better fit (root MSE is 1.28 
vs. 1.51).  Results from models [1] (with country level heteroscedasticity and country-specific 
AR1 error correlation within panels; root MSE is 0.85) and [3] (with country-level random 
effects possibly correlated with the Xs; root MSE is 0.62) are qualitatively similar, but most 
effects  are  smaller  in  size  (although  equally  significant  and  with  overlapping  confidence 
intervals). The smallest effects are found in the mixed-effects model [3], in which the role of 
within-country variation of macro factors is most pronounced; for EPL, union density and 
GDP per capita the effects in this specification are even statistically not significant. The only 
effect whose sign for Western European and Nordic countries is not robust is the one of the 
population with immigrant background; note that in the best fitting model [3] this effect is 
also not significant.      
   
5 Macro determinants of informal employment in Europe at large 
 
  As we have seen above, some of the macro level effects have opposite directions in the 
two part of Europe (―East & South‖ vs. ―West & North‖); on the other hand, the analysis 
conducted so far does not allow to account for large income differences between the West and 
the East, and substantial differences in social norms between the North and the South. This   26 
section aims at revealing the macro factors which are significant determinants of employment 
informality in the Europe at large, as heterogeneous as it is.    
   Models [4]-[6] in Table 6 (similar in specification to models [1]-[3] discussed above) 
estimate the effects of institutional and other macro factors on the share of employees without 
contracts in the labor force across Europe. The sample covers all EU-27 countries except 
Cyprus, Malta, and Luxembourg, plus Norway, Russia, and Ukraine; in total, there are 67 
observations  on  27  countries.  Furthermore,  Table  7  presents  seemingly  unrelated 
simultaneous estimates of the determinants of the shares of informal dependent employment 
and informal self-employment,  as well as the total share of unemployed and discouraged 
workers in the [extended] labor force. Specification {1} = {[1a], [1b], [1c]} in Table 7 covers 
the same above mentioned 27 countries but does not control for spending on labor market 
measures, whilst specification {2} = {[2a], [2b], [2c]} includes these controls but excludes 
Russia and Ukraine. In the self-employment models [1b], [2b] the Government Effectiveness 
variable is instrumented (see Annex 2 for details) with median trust in the police, whilst in 
remaining four models exogeneity of GOV_EFFECT is not rejected  (p-values range from 
0.55 to 0.82). 
   As  expected,  government  effectiveness  and  business  freedom  have  a  negative  and 
highly  significant  impact  on  dependent  informal  employment  across  Europe;  business 
freedom negatively affects also informal self-employment. On the other hand, the minimum 
wage level and short-term economic growth have a positive impact on the shares of both non-
contracted  employees  and  informal  self-employed,  whilst  the  positive  effect  of  GDP  per 
capita is significant only for dependent informal employment.  It appears that in the case of 
minimum wage the demand side effects prevail, whilst for the income and growth, the scale 
effect dominates the [hypothetical] substitution effect (see Section 2).  
  Most specifications suggest that an increase in minimum wage level relative to average 
wage in industry and services by  one percentage point will raise the share of dependent 
informal employment by about 0.35 percentage points (Table 6, model [4]; Table 7, models 
[1a], [2a]); one specification (Table 6, model [5]) suggests 0.25 points instead. However, a 
model with country-level random effects which includes interaction of minimum wage with 
union  density  (Table  6,  model  [6])  provides  a  more  complicated  picture:  The  estimated 
marginal effect of a 1 point increase in minimum wage on informal employment declines 
from 0.27 percentage points when union density is 10% to  -0.24 percentage points when 
union density is 50%; the effect is positive for union density values below 31% but significant 
only if density is less than 20%.  The average union density in the sample countries where 
minimum  wage exists  is  22.6%, and at this  value the marginal  effect  of minimum  wage   27 
increase is still positive (0.11 percentage points), although smaller than in other models and 
not statistically significant.  
   In addition, in countries without a nationwide minimum wage (i.e., Germany, Austria, 
Italy, and the Nordic countries), the share of employees without contracts in the labor force is, 
on average, by 3 to 4 percentage points below the level predicted for these countries by 
models [4] and [6] (Table 6), assuming the average (for respective part of Europe) minimum 
wage level
27.  
  The effects of union density on informal dependent employment are not significant in 
the simultaneous models of Table 7, but models which either allow for country-specific error 
autocorrelation  or  include  country-specific  random  effects  (Table  6,  models  [4]  and  [6]) 
suggest that a higher union density leads to more workers without contracts, other things 
equal (recall that an opposite effect was found within the sample of Eastern and Southern 
European countries). The size of the effect is however rather small. According to model [4] in 
Table 6, a one percentage point increase in union density is expected to raise the share of 
informal employees by 0.06 percentage points, other things equal; at the same time, the share 
of informal self-employed is expected to fall by the same amount (Table 7, models [1b], [2b]). 
Model  [6]  (Table  6)  suggests  that  the  effect  of  union  density  on  dependent  informal 
employment declines with minimum wage level, being positive as long as minimum wage 
level is below 41.6% (but significant only if it is below 32%); at the sample mean value of 
minimum  wage  of  38.3%,  the  effect  is  0.04  percentage  points.  Plausibly,  unions  and 
minimum wage level are substitutes as long as attractiveness of formal jobs is concerned but 
complements in terms of raising cost of formal labor. 
   A 10% increase in GDP per capita (at PPP) is expected to push the share of non-
contracted employees up by about 0.4 percentage points, other things equal. An increase in 
year-on-year real economic growth by a one percentage point will raise dependent informal 
employment by about 0.1 percentage point. 
  We have found evidence that (at given unemployment rate) active labor market policy 
spending tends to reduce informal self-employment and unemployment; passive labor market 
policy spending tends to increase unemployment, whilst has no significant impact on informal 
employment. 
  In accordance with theoretical expectations, the higher is the proportion of first and 
second generation immigrants in population, and the higher is income inequality, the higher 
the share of informal employees in the labor force; the inequality effect on informal self-
                                                 
27 This effect of existence of minimum wage is not found in models [1a], [2a] reported in Table 7, where this 
factor is not significant. However, we consider models from Table 6 superior, as they have much smaller MSE‘s  
(2.10 and 0.93 vs. 2.97 and 3.11).    28 
employment is also positive (and even stronger), whilst the effect of immigrant population is 
negative in this case. 
  We  now  turn  to  the  factors  whose  effects  are  less  easily  reconciled  with  either 
theoretical predictions or results found when analyzing the two parts of Europe separately. 
EPL strictness and tax wedge on labor are found to reduce informal dependent employment, 
other things equal. The EPL effect is not totally surprising, given the negative correlation 
between EPL and informal dependent employment in the raw data within the ―West & North‖ 
sample (Figure 1, right)
28. As noted in Table 2, workers might perceive a stricter EPL as 
enhancing job security, which makes formal jobs more desirable and reduces voluntary exit 
from the formal labor market. It is in principle possible that when all European countries are 
pooled together, this supply side effect has outweighed the EPL effect on the cost of formal 
labor. Another explanation is related to the fact that within both ―East & South‖ and ―West & 
North‖  samples,  the  low-EPL  countries  have  above  average  income  level:  High  market 
wage level works as a substitute for EPL, making formal labor too expensive. 
  The effect of tax wedge for low wage earners on employment informality is a priori 
ambiguous,  but  turned  out  to  be  highly  significant  and  sizable  negative.  We  propose  the 
following explanations. First, there is a positive correlation between the tax wedge and the 
efficiency of the fiscal system across European countries. Countries with high tax rates are 
also the countries able and willing to enforce them – and vice versa. Indeed, Table 8 provides 
evidence that proportion of respondents expecting some punishment (fine or prison) for a 
person whose undeclared economic activity is detected, is positively affected by tax wedge 
(or tax rates), even when general law enforcement indicator is controlled.
 29 Second, a cultural 
factor might be at work, too – if the tax morale is inherently higher in countries with high tax 
rates (see evidence in Torgler, 2010). Third, heavier tax burden creates a negative scale effect 
on [informal and formal] labor demand by formal enterprises, as well a negative income effect 
reducing demand for informally  produced  goods  and services.  Together, these  effects  (of 
which the first one is likely the strongest) overcome [labor and product market] substitution 




                                                 
28 Moreover, although the EPL effect is positive in the ―East & South‖ models (see Section 3), its contribution to 
the explanatory power those models is rather small. 
29 Fialova and O. Schneider (2011: Table 4) also find a negative impact of labor taxation on the share of labor 
force not contributing to the pension system in the sample of 26 European countries; they relate it to „improving 
quality of public services and provision of a better legal environment in high-tax countries‖; our explanation is 
similar in spirit but not identical.   29 
  In this paper, we have studied institutional and other macro determinants of prevalence 
of  informal  dependent  employment,  as  well  as  informal  self-employment  in  European 
countries. To our best knowledge, this is the first multi-country study which conducts such an 
analysis for Europe using direct survey data on work without legal contract rather than proxy 
measures of the size of informal dependent workforce. Accounting for joint determination of 
informal  wage  employment,  informal  self-employment,  and  unemployment  is  another 
distinctive feature of our analysis.  
  We have conducted analysis separately for three country groups: Eastern and Southern 
Europe, Western European and Nordic countries, and Europe at large. Table 10 summarizes 
the directions of the effects across country groups, two types of informal employment, and 
specifications.  A  plus  sign  in  a  row  titled  X  and  a  column  titled  T  for  country  group  G 
indicates  that  variable  X  has  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on  the  share  of  informal 
employment of type T in country group G at least in some (typically, in all) specifications 
reported in that column, and never has a significant negative effect. Minus sign is interpreted 
in  a  similar  way
30.  Zero  refers  to  a  variable  insignificant  in  every  specification  (within 
column).  In  each  column,  superscripts  indicate  alternative  specifications;  entries  without 
superscripts refer to variables common to all specifications
31. 
  Many factors appear to work in the expected way (or at least in the same way when 
expectations  are  ambiguous)  in  all  three  country  groups.  Consistently  with  theoretical 
predictions, quality of business environment (represented by Business Freedom, Investment 
Freedom,  Trade  Freedom,  and  Monetary  Freedom)  has  a  significant  negative  impact  on 
prevalence of both types of informal employment when other factors, including GDP level 
and growth, are controlled. Noteworthy, the specific product-market-related factors which 
appear as significant differ between the two country groups: In Eastern and Southern Europe, 
these are Investment Freedom and Trade Freedom, whilst in Western and Northern Europe - 
Business  Freedom  and  Monetary  Freedom;  when  all  countries  are  pooled  together,  it  is 
Business Freedom which matters.  
  The share of non-contracted employees is negatively affected by perceived quality of 
public services (represented by Government Effectiveness, Satisfaction with the Government, 
                                                 
30 A sign in parentheses refers to a marginally insignificant effect (P-values between 0.10 and 0.13). 
31 Table 10 also provides comparisons with the results of four other studies where the dependent variable is one 
of the following proxies for informal employment: (i) share of labor force not contributing to the pension system; 
(ii) share of self-employed in the labor force; (iii) share of workers without a contract or with a temporary 
contract. The results reviewed in Table 10 refer to: Fialova and O. Schneider (2011) – for a panel (2006-2007) of 
25 European countries, using all three proxies;  Perry et al. (2007) and Loayza et al. (2009)  - for cross-sections 
of 57 to 70 world countries, using proxies (i) and (ii); Loayza and Rigolini (2006) – for a panel (ending in 2004) 
of 42 world countries and a sub-panel of 18 developing countries, using proxies (i) and (ii).   30 
and Rule of Law variables). These effects are among the largest (in absolute terms) in most 
specifications and for all country groups. 
  In emerging Europe (East and South) and in wealthy Europe (West and North) alike, as 
well as in Europe at large, the share of non-contracted employees is positively related to 
economic growth (plausibly, through demand side channels - the scale effect and the time 
pressure). The same is true for informal self-employment in Eastern and Southern Europe and 
in Europe at large, whilst in Western and Northern Europe this effect is absent. These findings 
suggest that informal [at the main job] employment is a pro-cyclic phenomenon in Europe. 
This is in line with finding by Hazans (2011a), based on 70 observations of 27 European 
countries, that the rates of dependent informal employment and unemployment never went up 
simultaneously between 2004 and 2009 
32. The level of GDP per capita has a positive and 
significant effect on the share of non-contracted employees in Europe at large and on both 
types of informal employment within Eastern and Southern Europe, again suggesting that the 
scale  effect  overcomes  both  the  substitution  effect  and  the  supply  side  effects.  Positive 
association between the income level and employment informality in Europe is in a sharp 
contrast  with  the  situation  found  in  large  samples  of  either  high-income  and  developing 
countries  across  the  world,  or  only  developing  countries,  or  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean (see Loayza and Rigolini, 2006; Perry et al., 2007; their results partly reported in 
Table 10). However, we find a negative effect of income level on employment informality 
when the wealthy part of Europe (the West and the North) is considered separately. Fialova 
and Schneider (2011) find a similar effect on self-employment for the ―old Europe‖ (the West, 
the North, and the South).  
  Note that our results are not directly comparable to those of Schneider et al. (2010) and 
Bajada and Schneider (2009) on determinants of the size of the shadow economy (although 
theoretical considerations are to a large extent similar, as long as factors controlled in all these 
studies are concerned). In fact, for 2004-2007 there is virtually no correlation between the size 
of the shadow economy as estimated in Schneider et al. (2010) and the share of informal (at 
the main job) employment, be it dependent, or own-account, or total. This is because a formal 
employee or a formal self-employed might contribute to the shadow economy (as defined in 
Schneider et al., 2010) via his/her main (formal) job or via secondary (formal or informal) 
                                                 
32 Data from Estonian Labor Force Survey (Statistics Estonia, 2010) provide partial support: during the growth 
period between 2003 and 2008, the rate of non-contracted employees was fairly stable near 2% of the labor 
force, but felt to 1% in 2009. Nikolovova et al. (2010: Figure 10) compare the dynamics of GDP growth and two 
(rough) proxies of the share of informal employment in the labor force for Czech R. and Slovakia, based on LFS 
data for 1998-2009. The overall dynamics of informality is clearly pro-cyclic, but during the 2009 recession (for 
Slovakia – also during the 1999 recession) in became counter-cyclic. Note that Nikolovova et al. (2010) use 
small establishment size or self-employment status as proxies for informal employment, because Czech and 
Slovak LFS (in contrast with Estonian LFS) do not provide information on employees without legal contract.    31 
job, let aside do-it-yourself activities, and the share of informal (at the main job) workers in 
the shadow output varies considerably across countries and time.  
  Therefore, negative association between the size of the shadow economy on one hand 
and GDP per capita and/or GDP growth on the other found in Schneider et al. (2010: Tables 
3.1 and A.4.1) for all country groups (developing, transition, high-income/OECD, and total) 
does  not,  in  principle,  contradict  to  our  results
33.  Nor  do  our  results  contradict  to  the 
―substitution effect‖ (positive association between short-term fluctuations in unemployment 
and short-term fluctuations in shadow economy) found by Bajada and Schneider (2009) for 
OECD countries. Rather, these results together suggest that non-contracted wage employment 
at the main job on one hand and undeclared earnings in general on the other follow different 
cyclicality patterns. 
  For  Europe  at  large,  as  well  as  within  Eastern  and  Southern  Europe,  both  income 
inequality and proportion of first and second generation immigrants in population positively 
affect the share of informal employees (in Europe at large – also the share of informal self-
employed) in the labor force. In Eastern and Southern Europe, a similar effect is found for the 
share of local born minority population. This is consistent with theoretical expectations (see 
Table 2) and available empirical evidence (on inequality: Chong and Gradstein, 2007; Perry et 
al.,  2007;  on  immigrants:  Ambrosini,  2001;  Flaquer  and  Escobedo,  2009;  Kahanec  and 
Zaiceva, 2009; Kahanec et al., 2010; Diaz-Serrano, 2010; Hazans, 2011a, 2011b; Say, 2011). 
   Bivariate  correlation  between  EPL  strictness  and  prevalence  of  informal  dependent 
employment  is  positive  in  Eastern  and  Southern  Europe  but  negative  among  Western 
European and Nordic countries (Figure 1);  yet in both country groups we find a positive 
impact of EPL on the share of non-contracted employees in the labor force when other factors 
are controlled for; this is consistent with the fact that EPL increases labor cost in the formal 
sector. However, in Europe at large, EPL strictness reduces informal dependent employment, 
other things equal. One explanation is that stricter EPL enhances attractiveness of formal jobs, 
and (in the pooled sample) this outweighs the effect EPL has on cost of formal labor. 
  Arguably, the most important distinctions between the two parts of Europe are related to 
the effect of the minimum wage on the share of informal dependent employment, as well as 
the effect of union density on the prevalence of both types of informal employment. Plausibly, 
this has to do with very different absolute levels of both minimum wage (e.g. in 2007, non-
weighted average was €1306 for the West vs. €322 for Eastern and Southern Europe) and 
union density (44% vs. 19% in our samples).  
                                                 
33 Schneider et al. (2010) use GDP and growth as determinants of the size of the shadow economy in some of 
their MIMIC models and as indicators in others, noting that ―there is some arbitrariness whether to use a certain 
variable as causal or indicator‖.    32 
  Other things equal, an increase in minimum wage level relative to average wage in 
industry and services by a one percentage point will raise the share of dependent informal 
employment by 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points in Eastern and Southern Europe, as well as when 
all countries are pooled together; however, if only Western European and Nordic countries are 
considered, the same reason will lead to a reduction of the above mentioned share by 1.7 
percentage points; in all three cases, the effect is highly significant
34. Comparison with the 
theoretical predictions suggests that the demand side effects prevail in the first two cases, 
whilst  the  supply  side  channels  of  the  impact  of  minimum  wage  level  (through  relative 
attractiveness of formal jobs and through labor force participation) prevail in Western and 
Northern  Europe.  Plausibly,  the  supply  side  effects  are  stronger  when  absolute  level  of 
minimum wage is higher. In all models, the minimum wage effects on unemployment and 
discouragement have the same directions as the effects on informal dependent employment. 
  European  countries  which  do  not  have  a  nationwide  minimum  wage  (this  group 
includes the Nordic countries, the German-speaking countries, and Italy) enjoy a substantially 
lower share of informal dependent employment than the one predicted for them assuming the 
average for the region minimum-to-average wage ratio. This suggests that in the wealthy part 
of Europe, the demand side effects of minimum wage  work through the existence of the 
institution as such: institutionalized minimum wage raises the demand for informal labor from 
formal enterprises, motivates nascent entrepreneurs to enter informal rather than formal sector 
or to switch from formal to informal, and makes higher the threshold to be accepted as a 
formal employee. This effect also appears in the best-fitting models for Europe at large (Table 
6, models [4] and [6]). 
  In  Eastern  and  Southern  Europe,  a  one  percentage  point  increase  in  union  density 
reduces  informal  dependent  (respectively,  self-)  employment  by  0.25  (respectively,  0.4) 
percentage  points;  in  Western  and  Northern  Europe  the  union  effect  is  of  opposite  sign 
(although much smaller in size). In the pooled sample, the effect is, on average, positive but 
small.  It appears that if union density is high enough, union pressure makes formal labor 
more expensive relative to informal, thus increasing demand for informal labor from formal 
enterprises, strengthening the motivation  for enterprises to become (or stay) informal, and 
raising the threshold for being accepted as a formal employee. However, as long as countries 
with low union coverage are concerned, monitoring, voice and job security seem to be the 
channels through which unions reduce informality. 
                                                 
34 However, for Europe at large, a model where minimum wage level is interacted with union density provides a 
more complicated picture (see Section 5).    33 
  Contrary to the traditional (cost-based) expectations, but similarly to Fialova and O. 
Schneider  (2011),  we  find  that  tax  wedge  on  labor  has  a  negative  effect  on  the  size  of 
informal employment across European countries, as well as within Western and Northern 
Europe, whilst in Eastern and Southern Europe tax rates are not of primary importance in 
determining the level of informal employment (the effect is positive but  relatively small). 
These results are in line with those of Friedman et al. (2000), Dreher et al. (2009) and Dreher 
and Schneider (2010), where tax burden has either negative or not significant effect on the size 
of shadow economy in big cross section of world countries. As Hibbs and Piculescu (2005) 
argue, the incentives to evade taxes depend not on tax rates as such but rather on net benefits 
from operating in the official sector; hence, when institutional quality is controlled for, the 
sign of the effect of fiscal burden is actually not clear. We argue that countries with high tax 
rates are also the countries able and willing to enforce them. Our results thus lend support to 
the school of thought emphasizing the institutional quality rather than fiscal burden as a key 
determinant of the level of shadow economic activities.  
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Table 1 Prevalence of informal employment in extended labor force. 
Selected European countries, 2004-2009 























































































































































































Eastern Europe  Western Europe 
PL  2004m10-2004m11  3.4  16.2  0.6  20.2  IE  2005m2-2005m5  26.9  13.1  1.1  41.1 
  2006m10-2006m11  4.3  13.1  0.2  17.6    2006m9-2007m6  25.0  14.3  1.0  40.3 
  2008m11-2009m1  4.1  16.6  0.9  21.6    2009m9-2010m3  18.1  13.4  1.5  33.0 
UA  2005m2-2005m2  6.2  4.0  0.4  10.6  UK  2004m10-2005m2  12.3  10.6  1.1  24.0 
  2006m12-2007m1  6.7  5.9  0.5  13.1    2006m9-2006m12  10.0  10.0  0.6  20.6 
  2009m3-2009m3  6.9  7.3  0.2  14.4    2008m9-2008m12  9.6  11.0  1.1  21.7 
SI  2004m10-2004m11  4.5  7.3  0.8  12.6  AT  2005m1-2005m4  7.2  10.2  0.7  18.1 
  2006m10-2006m11  3.4  5.9  0.6  9.9    2007m8-2007m10  8.5  9.9  1.3  19.7 
  2008m10-2008m12  6.2  7.2  0.7  14.1  CH  2004m9-2005m2  1.7  11.4  0.7  13.8 
BG  2006m12-2006m12  7.8  5.9  1.5  15.2    2006m9-2007m2  2.5  13.1  0.8  16.4 
  2009m3-2009m4  5.3  6.7  1.2  13.2    2008m9-2009m3  1.9  11.5  0.3  13.7 
CZ  2004m10-2004m12  2.2  9.0  0.7  11.9  NL  2004m9-2005m1  5.1  8.0  0.6  13.7 
  2009m6-2009m7  1.3  10.7  0.5  12.5    2006m9-2007m2  4.1  7.3  0.7  12.1 
SK  2004m10-2004m12  1.9  10.4  0.3  12.6    2008m9-2009m5  2.4  9.1  1.1  12.6 
  2006m12-2007m2  2.2  9.3  0.1  11.6  DE  2004m9-2005m1  1.8  8.4  0.5  10.7 
  2008m11-2009m2  1.2  11.0  0.0  12.2    2006m9-2007m1  1.3  9.6  0.3  11.2 
RU  2006m9-2006m12  5.0  4.8  0.3  10.1    2008m9-2009m1  1.6  10.1  0.2  11.9 
  2008m11-2009m3  6.1  5.4  0.5  12.0  FR  2006m10-2007m2  3.8  6.0  0.3  10.1 
RO  2008m12-2009m1  5.1  5.9  0.8  11.8    2008m10-2008m12  2.7  7.1  0.5  10.3 
EE  2004m10-2005m1  1.8  6.2  0.2  8.2  BE  2004m10-2005m1  2.0  9.2  1.0  12.2 
  2006m11-2007m4  3.7  4.1  0.7  8.5    2006m10-2007m2  1.6  9.2  0.9  11.7 
  2008m11-2009m2  3.2  6.3  0.3  9.8    2008m11-2009m2  1.6  8.4  0.5  10.5 
HU  2005m4-2005m5  3.3  8.2  0.6  12.1             
  2006m11-2007m1  2.1  6.5  1.3  9.9             
  2009m2-2009m3  2.6  6.2  0.6  9.4             
LV  2007m7-2007m8  6.1  3.1  0.9  10.1             
  2009m4-2009m8  3.7  3.6  0.7  8.0             
LT  2009m10-2009m12  2.2  4.2  0.0  6.4             
Southern Europe  Northern Europe 
CY  2006m10-2006m12  40.6  14.5  3.3  58.4  NO  2004m9-2004m12  5.1  9.6  0.2  14.9 
  2008m10-2008m12  35.2  14.5  3.3  53.0    2006m8-2006m11  5.6  9.1  0.5  15.2 
GR  2005m1-2005m3  18.7  25.5  2.4  46.6    2008m8-2008m12  4.7  7.2  0.4  12.3 
  2009m8-2009m11  18.2  26.2  2.3  46.7  DK  2004m10-2004m12  5.2  6.0  0.4  11.6 
IL  2008m10-2009m3  25.5  10.7  0.6  36.8    2006m10-2007m2  7.9  7.3  0.1  15.3 
IT  2006m2-2006m5  2.9  19.2  0.3  22.4    2008m9-2008m12  3.9  7.5  0.1  11.5 
PT  2004m11-2005m3  4.0  15.6  0.2  19.8  FI  2004m9-2004m12  0.6  10.1  0.2  10.9 
  2006m11-2007m2  7.6  12.8  0.4  20.8    2006m9-2006m12  0.5  9.6  0.1  10.2 
  2008m11-2009m3  7.6  13.8  1.0  22.4    2008m10-2009m1  0.9  10.1  0.2  11.2 
ES  2004m10-2005m1  4.1  13.1  0.5  17.7  SE  2004m10-2005m1  0.4  7.8  0.2  8.4 
  2006m11-2007m2  5.1  14.4  0.9  20.4    2006m10-2007m1  0.5  7.3  0.3  8.1 
  2008m9-2008m11  4.4  13.9  0.5  18.8    2008m10-2009m1  0.8  7.1  0.3  8.2 
Notes: Informal self-employment includes: (i) All non-professional self-employed operating solely; 
(ii) Employers with 5 or fewer workers. Persons working without a contract for own family‘s business (family 
workers) are considered separately and not accounted for in the models presented in Tables 3-7. Informal 
dependent employment includes employees (persons in a dependent employment relationship) without a contract 
or who is uncertain of their contract. Labor force is extended to include all non-employed persons willing to 
work. Data collection period is 5% trimmed. Source: Calculation with ESS data.   40 
Table 3A Macro determinants of the shares of informal employees,  
 informal self-employed, and  unemployed (incl. discouraged)  in the extended labor force.  
Eastern and Southern Europe, 2004-2009 
  (seemingly unrelated regressions)   
 
Dependent variables  












(robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries) 
  [1a]  [2a]  [1b]  [2b]  [1c]  [2c] 
Employment Protection 
Legislation strictness, v. 2 
3.129***  2.092***  3.647***  1.837*  -0.985  0.271 
  (0.804)  (0.813)  (1.271)  (0.917)  (1.269)  (1.228) 
Rule of Law   -13.181***    -10.178**    -3.185   
  (2.563)    (4.308)    (2.252)   
Government Effectiveness  
(lagged 1 year) 
  -5.339**    -0.056    -3.946 
  (2.549)    (1.521)    (3.256) 
Investment Freedom    -0.181***    -0.336***    0.046 
  (0.069)    (0.055)    (0.074) 
Trade Freedom    -0.074*    0.046    -0.143** 
  (0.039)    (0.043)    (0.057) 
Tax Wedge on low wage 
earners, % (lagged 1 year) 
0.196*    0.128    -0.126   
  (0.106)    (0.236)    (0.142)   
Minimum Wage (% of average 
wage in industry & services) 
0.429***  0.352***  0.356**  0.301***  0.447***  0.445*** 
 (0.089)  (0.082)  (0.181)  (0.081)  (0.086)  (0.071) 
log GDP per capita, PPP USD 
(annual average, lagged 1 year) 
6.643***  3.333**  7.751***  4.040***  -0.69  -0.653 
 (1.636)  (1.538)  (3.005)  (1.366)  (1.282)  (1.630) 
Real GDP Growth,  y-o-y, 
quarterly data lagged 1 quarter 
0.034  0.129*  0.049  0.149***  -0.124  -0.107 
 (0.063)  (0.069)  (0.074)  (0.057)  (0.113)  (0.112) 
Union Density,  
% of employees 
-0.194***  -0.252***  -0.252**  -0.411***  -0.073  -0.077 
(0.052)  (0.072)  (0.114)  (0.081)  (0.050)  (0.059) 
Population with immigrant 
background, % 
0.178***  0.205***  -0.090  0.017  -0.100*  -0.122* 
(0.050)  (0.066)  (0.107)  (0.090)  (0.058)  (0.065) 
Root MSE  1.8761  2.0460  3.8393  2.9874  3.6423  3.6560 
R-squared  0.8135  0.7867  0.6383  0.7895  0.5080  0.5234 
# obs.   [# countries]  35   [14]  35   [14]  35   [14] 
Descriptive statistics on dependent variables 
Mean  5.14  9.77  12.28 
Std. Dev.  3.80  5.58  4.54 
Min  1.2  3.1  3.7 
Max  18.7  26.2  23 
Notes: Countries covered: CZ (2004, 2009); SK (2004, 2006, 2008); PL (2004, 2006, 2008); HU (2005, 2006, 
2009);  EE  (2004,  2006,  2008);  LV  (2007,  2009);  SI  (2004,  2006,  2008);  BG  (2006,  2009);  RO  (2008);  
RU(2006, 2008); UA (2005, 2006, 2009); ES (2004, 2006, 2008); PT (2004, 2006, 2008); GR (2005, 2009).   
See Annex 1 for details on the explanatory variables. Constant terms are not reported.  
*, **, *** -  coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
Sources: Dependent variables: Calculations with ESS data (see Table 1 for details). Explanatory variables - see 
Annex 1 (Table A1). Model estimates - own calculations (Stata  simultaneous estimates with clustered robust 
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Table 3B Macro determinants of the shares of informal employees,  
 informal self-employed, and  unemployed (incl. discouraged)  in the extended labor force.  
Eastern and Southern EU members, 2004-2009 
  (seemingly unrelated regressions)   
 
Dependent variables  











(robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries) 
  [1a]  [2a]  [1b]  [2b]  [1c]  [2c] 
Employment Protection 
Legislation strictness, v. 2 
 7.717***   7.717***  6.893***  6.893***  -2.213  -2.213 
  (1.073)    (1.077)  (1.811)  (1.811)  (4.666)  (4.666) 
Government Effectiveness  
(lagged 1 year) 




)  -3.492  -3.492 
(0.596)  (0.598)  (1.524)  (1.524)  (2.698)  (2.698) 
Investment Freedom  -0.099***  -0.099***  -0.168**  -0.168**  0.025  0.025 
(0.028)  (0.028)  (0.069)  (0.069)  (0.155)  (0.155) 
Trade Freedom      -0.282***  -0.282***  -0.122  -0.122 
    (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.174)  (0.174) 
Tax Wedge on low wage 
earners, % (lagged 1 year) 
0.189***  0.189***  -0.270**  -0.270**  -0.325**  -0.325** 
(0.071)  (0.071)  (0.109)  (0.109)  (0.146)  (0.146) 
Minimum Wage (% of average 
wage in industry & services); 
{1} assigns sample mean to IT  
0.588***  0.588***      0.512***  0.512*** 
(0.052)  (0.052)      (0.168)  (0.168) 
ITALY 
 (does not have a 
minimum wage) 
 
-2.693***        4.580   
(0.715)        (3.569)   
log GDP per capita, PPP USD 
(annual average, lagged 1 year) 
4.823***  4.823***  8.350***  8.350***  -2.850  -2.850 
(0.504)  (0.506)  (0.962)  (0.962)  (3.372)  (3.384) 
Real GDP Growth,  y-o-y, 
quarterly data lagged 1 quarter 
0.109**  0.109**  0.039  0.039  -0.186***  -0.186*** 
(0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
Union Density,  
% of employees 
-0.361**  -0.361**  -0.399***  -0.399***  0.062  0.062 
(0.035)  (0.035)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.122)  (0.122) 
UI spending, %GDP per perc. 
point unempl. (lagged 1 year) 




43.61  43.61 
(8.437)  (8.467)  (21.636)  (21.636)  (48.80)  (48.97) 
ALMP spending, %GDP per 
percentage point unempl. 
(lagged 1 year) 
        -76.33*  -76.33
(*
) 
        (46.45)  (46.61) 
Minority population (native), 
% 
0.220***  0.220***  -0.199**  -0.199**  0.006  0.006 
(0.030)  (0.031)  (0.085)  (0.085)  (0.137)  (0.137) 
Population with immigrant 
background, % 
-0.073  -0.073  0.298***  0.298***  -0.075  -0.075 
(0.055)  (0.055)  (0.116)  (0.116)  (0.259)  (0.260) 
Root MSE  1.2232  1.2232  2.3602   2.4329  4.1745  4.1745 
R-squared  0.9477  0.9472  0.8988  0.8988  0.5936  0.5904 
# obs.   [# countries]  30 [13]  29 [12]  30 [13]  29 [12]  30 [13]  29 [12] 
Descriptive statistics on dependent variables 
Mean  4.92  4.99  10.89  10.60  12.58  12.50 
Std. Dev.  4.09  4.15  5.89  5.78  4.71  4.77 
Min  1.2  1.2  3.1  3.1  3.7  3.7 
Max  18.7  18.7  26.2  26.2  23.0  23.0 
Notes: Countries covered: CZ (2004, 2009); SK (2004, 2006, 2008); PL (2004, 2006, 2008); HU (2005, 2006, 
2009); EE (2004, 2006, 2008); LV (2007, 2009); SI (2004, 2006, 2008); BG (2006, 2009); RO (2008); ES (2004, 
2006, 2008); PT (2004, 2006, 2008); GR (2005, 2009). Models [1a],  [1b], [1c] include also Italy (2006).  
See Annex 1 for details on the explanatory variables. Constant terms are not reported.  
(*
), *, **, *** -  coefficient is significantly different from zero at 11%, 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
Sources: Dependent variables: Calculations with ESS data (see Table 1 for details). Explanatory variables - see 
Annex 1 (Table A1). Model estimates - own calculations (Stata  simultaneous estimates with clustered robust 
standard errors have been applied after fitting linear models by OLS).   42 
Table 4 Macro determinants of the shares of informal employees in the extended labor force.  
Eastern and Southern Europe, 2004-2009  
(alternative panel data estimates) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
  Prais-Winsten regressions, errors 
heteroscedastic, with country-specific 







panel-data models with 
semi-robust SE‘s  
clustered on countries 
c 
Employment Protection 
 Legislation strictness  
 
1.287*  2.123***  2.075**  2.227*  2.581***  3.645*** 
(0.674)  (0.775)  (0.900)  (1.198)  (0.928)  (1.123) 
Rule of Law (lagged 1 yr  
if field work started 
earlier than September)  
        -10.513***  -9.761*** 
        (2.346)  (2.140) 
Govt. Effectiveness  
(lagged 1 year) 
-6.571***  -5.357***  -5.419***  -1.949*     
(2.193)  (1.845)  (1.828)  (1.061)     
Investment Freedom  -0.222***  -0.215***  -0.213***  -0.135***     
(0.052)  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.044)     
Trade Freedom  -0.058*  -0.066**  -0.061**       
(0.032)  (0.027)  (0.025)       
Tax Wedge for low wage  
earners, % (lagged 1 yr) 
    -0.025    0.088   
    (0.120)    (0.113)   
Implicit tax rate on labor 
income, % 
          0.189** 
          (0.088) 
Minimum Wage (% of 
average wage in industry 
& services) 
0.383***  0.359***  0.359***  0.203***  0.377***  0.488*** 
(0.048)  (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.071)  (0.111)  (0.165) 
log GDP per capita, PPP 
USD (annual average, 
lagged 1 year) 
4.571***  3.441***  3.475***  0.465  5.594***  4.605*** 
(1.046)  (0.995)  (1.000)  (0.469)  (1.905)  (1.551) 
Real GDP Growth y-o-y 
(previous quarter) 
0.214***  0.136**  0.132**  0.078*  0.047  0.035 
(0.039)  (0.057)  (0.064)  (0.042)  (0.058)  (0.066) 
Union Density,  
% of employees 
-0.303***  -0.297***  -0.295***  -0.190***  -0.117**  -0.177** 
(0.049)  (0.044)  (0.048)  (0.061)  (0.051)  (0.072) 
IMMIGR: % pop. with 
immigrant background 
0.310***  0.194***  0.194***  0.193  0.166**  0.139*** 
(0.031)  (0.054)  (0.057)  (0.128)  (0.065)  (0.052) 
Country random-effects 
parameters 
           
 sd(beta[IMMIGR] )        0.201     
sd(ui)        1.345     
Residuals: sd(eit), East        1.086     
  Residuals: sd(eit), South        1.786     
LR  test  vs.  a  model 
without random effects        Prob > chi2  
= 0.0035     
Root MSE  1.8553  1.6659  1.6744  0.9660  1.9891 
 
1.9296 
  R-squared  0.9275  0.9140  0.9154             
# obs.   [# countries]  37 [16]  35 [14]  35 [14]  35 [14]  35 [14]  30 [12] 
Notes: Countries covered: For models [2] – [5], see Notes to Table 3A. Model [1] covers also Israel (2008) and 
Lithuania (2009). Model [6] excludes Russia and Ukraine. Models [2] – [6] include at least 2 observations for 
each country but Romania. See Annex 1 for details on the explanatory variables. Constant terms are not reported. 
a See Davison and MacKinnon (1993): 343-351; Beck and Katz (1995).  
b See Greene (2008): 233-238. 
c See 
Liang and Zeger (1986); Zeger et al. (1988). Results are obtained by averaging random effects across population. 
Models [5] and [6] assume all off-diagonal error correlations within panels to be equal (estimated rho: 0.429 in 
[5] and 0.153 in [6]). Random effects in [4]-[6] may correlate with explanatory variables.  *, **, *** - coefficient 
is significantly different from zero at 10%, 5%, 1% level.  
Sources: Model estimates - own calculations.  Dependent and explanatory variables: See Table 1 and Table A1.   43 
Table 4 Macro Determinants of the Shares of Informal employees in the Extended Labor Force.  
Eastern and Southern Europe, 2004-2009  
(alternative panel data estimates, continued) 
  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]  [11]  [12] 
  Population-averaged panel-data models 
(semi-robust standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses) 
  Employment Protection 
 Legislation strictness, v. 2 
3.138***  3.387***  3.343***  3.426***  4.302***  3.216*** 
(0.571)  (0.647)  (0.749)  (0.820)  (0.469)  (0.683) 
Govt. Effectiveness 
a 
(Rule of Law in [11]) 
a 
-5.097***  -4.401***  -4.301***  -4.003***  -3.397***  -2.926* 
(1.442)  (1.693)  (1.674)  (1.350)  (1.237)  (1.562) 
Investment Freedom 
a  -0.043*  -0.063***  -0.065**  -0.056***     
  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.020)     
Tax Wedge for low wage  
earners, % 
a 
        0.268***  0.112* 
        (0.049)  (0.059) 
Implicit Tax Rate on Labor 
 income, % 
a 
0.300***  0.420***  0.413***  0.334***     
(0.081)  (0.087)  (0.090)  (0.075)     
MINWAGE: Minimum wage (% 
of average wage in industry & 
services); [7] & [8] assign to 
Italy sample mean(MINWAGE) 
= 36.88  
0.643***  0.561***  0.555***  0.627***  0.492***  0.498*** 
(0.041)  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.059)  (0.060)  (0.060) 
ITALY 




-7.727***  -10.181***         
(1.646)  (2.129)         
log GDP per capita, PPP USD 
(annual average) 
a 
5.787***  7.186***  7.155***  4.991***  2.023**  1.405 
(1.069)  (1.102)  (1.116)  (1.095)  (0.926)  (1.076) 
Real GDP Growth y-o-y  
(previous quarter) 
0.237***  0.271***  0.266***  0.248***  0.140***  0.181*** 
(0.064)  (0.094)  (0.094)  (0.081)  (0.035)  (0.034) 
Union Density,  
% of employees 
-0.203***  -0.253***  -0.250***  -0.258***  -0.323***  -0.225*** 
(0.020)  (0.043)  (0.046)  (0.041)  (0.030)  (0.032) 
ALMP spending, %GDP per 
percentage point unempl. 
a 
-71.283***      -68.893***     





UI spending, %GDP per 
percentage point unempl. 
a 
  -40.164***  -40.093***       
  (4.239)  (4.838)       
UBSA: Average unempl. benefit 
and social assistance net 
replacement rate over 60  
months of unemployment, % 
a 
        -0.845***  -0.719*** 
       
(0.098)  (0.105) 
UBSA-squared/100          0.776***  0.625*** 
        (0.101)  (0.098) 
Gini index 
a  0.199***  0.386***  0.383***  0.226**     
(0.063)  (0.086)  (0.098)  (0.104)     
Minority population (native), %  0.218***  0.268***  0.269***  0.252***     
(0.022)  (0.032)  (0.035)  (0.037)     
Root MSE  1.657  1.694  1.704  1.614  1.048  1.240 
# obs.   [# countries]  31 [14]  30 [14]  29 [13]  29 [13]  27 [12]  27 [12] 
Obs. per country, min/avg./max  1/2.2/3  1/2.1/3  1/2.2/3  1/2.2/3  1/2.3/3  1/2.3/3 
Notes: Constant terms are not reported. Countries covered: Model [7]: CZ (2004, 2009); SK ( 2006, 2008); PL 
(2004, 2006, 2008); HU (2005, 2006, 2009); EE (2004, 2006, 2008); LV (2007, 2009); LT(2009);  SI (2004, 
2006, 2008); BG (2006, 2009);    RO (2008);  ES (2004, 2006, 2008); PT (2004, 2006, 2008);  IT (2006); GR 
(2005, 2009). Model [8] excludes SI (2004).  Models [9]-[10] exclude also IT. Models [11]-[12] exclude also EE 
(2004), LT (2009), and BG (2006), but include SK (2004).  
a Lagged 1 year. 
Sources: Dependent variables: Calculations with ESS data (see Table 1 for details). Explanatory variables - see 
Annex 1 (Table A1). Model estimates - own calculations.   44 
Table 5 Macro determinants of the shares of informal employees,  
informal self-employed, and unemployed (incl. discouraged) in the extended labor force.  









    (% of labor force extended to include discouraged workers) 
  Estimated coefficients (robust standard errors clustered on countries) 
  [1a]  [2a]  [1b]  [2b]  [1c]  [2c] 
Employment Protection 
Legislation Strictness, v. 2 
7.651**  7.140***  -1.298**  -0.788  5.165***  5.604*** 
(3.860)  (2.388)  (0.620)  (0.597)  (1.243)  (1.491) 
Government Effectiveness 
([1a]: instrumented, see Annex 2 ) 
-6.200**    -2.000**    -2.551   
(3.028)    (1.074)    (1.771)   
Satisfaction with the Govt. 
([2c]: instrumented, see Annex 2 ) 
  -2.609***    -0.274    -0.362 
  (0.681)    (0.191)    (0.671) 
(Government Expenditures as 
% of GDP), squared /100 
  -0.161  -0.252***  -0.305***  -0.179***  -0.245*** 
  (0.104)  (0.052)  (0.055)  (0.068)  (0.084) 
Business Freedom  -0.119**    -0.042***    -0.038   
(0.051)    (0.015)    (0.032)   
Monetary Freedom  
(lagged 1 year) 
  -0.394***    -0.030    0.024 
  (0.126)    (0.073)    (0.157) 
Tax Wedge for low wage 
earners, % (lagged 1 year) 
-0.742***  -0.764***  -0.072*  -0.062  -0.115**  -0.089 
(0.213)  (0.111)  (0.039)  (0.048)  (0.053)  (0.061) 
Minimum Wage (% of average 
wage in industry & services) 
a 
-1.720**  -1.471***  0.182*  0.144  -0.829***  -0.842** 
(0.674)  (0.395)  (0.103)  (0.112)  (0.292)  (0.376) 
NO_MINWAGE: the country 
does not have a minimum wage 
-2.468*  -0.890  1.058***  1.049**  -0.692  -0.991 
(1.526)  (1.167)  (0.320)  (0.534)  (0.679)  (0.871) 
log GDP per capita, PPP USD 
(annual average, lagged 1 year) 
-2.854  -8.352**  -2.855**  -4.309***  -19.053***  -19.977*** 
(6.385)  (4.178)  (1.276)  (1.509)  (2.402)  (2.317) 
Real GDP Growth,  y-o-y, 
quarterly data lagged 1 quarter 
0.094  0.447***  0.071  0.087  -0.505***  -0.496*** 
(0.113)  (0.162)  (0.074)  (0.070)  (0.064)  (0.104) 
LMP_ACTIVE: Active labor 
market measures spending, %  
GDP per percentage point of 
unemployment (lagged 1 yr) 
    -7.158***  -6.865***  -26.202***  -26.165*** 
    (2.487)  (2.077)  (5.626)  (6.533) 
LMP_PASSIVE: Defined in the 
same way as LMP_ACTIVE 
23.538***  25.798***      18.609***  17.967*** 
(8.589)  (4.380)      (5.178)  (5.670) 
UBSA (defined in Table 4), 
lagged 1 year 
-0.488***  -0.416***         
(0.141)  (0.074)         
Union Density,  
% of employees 
0.078**  0.091***  0.032***  0.031***  0.114***  0.112*** 
(0.037)  (0.023)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.021) 
Population with Immigrant 
Background, % 
 0.057   0.098  0.009  0.037  0.438***  0.458*** 
(0.184)  (0.104)  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.091)  (0.085) 
Root MSE  1.5150  1.8328  0.8655  0.9444  1.774  1.834 
R-squared  0.8937  0.9518  0.8912  0.8704  0.8462  0.8356 
# obs.   [# countries]  34   [12]  34   [12]  34   [12] 
Descriptive statistics on dependent variables 
Mean  5.52  9.40  7.47 
Std. Dev.  6.50  2.09  3.52 
Min  0.4  6.0  2.6 
Max  26.9  14.3  18.8 
Notes: Countries covered: (A) with a national minimum wage:  FR, BE, UK, IE NL; (B) without a national 
minimum wage:  AT, CH, DE, DK, FI, NO, SE.   
a Countries without a minimum wage assigned sample mean.  
*, **, *** -  coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  
Sources: Dependent variables: Calculations with ESS data (see Table 1 for details). Explanatory variables - see 
Annex 1 (Table A1). Model estimates - own calculations (Stata  simultaneous estimates with clustered robust 
standard errors have been applied after fitting linear models by OLS).   45 
Table 6 Macro determinants of the shares of informal employees in the extended labor force. 
Western European and Nordic countries and Europe at large, 2004-2009  
(alternative panel data estimates) 
  Western and Northern Europe  Europe (all regions) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Employment Protection 
Legislation Strictness, v. 2 
2.174*  7.998***  0.936  -2.652***  -1.551  -1.813 
(1.274)  (0.693)  (2.082)  (0.898)  (0.960)  (1.309) 
Government effectiveness 
 (in [3] – [6] lagged 1 year) 
-8.207***  -12.765***  -4.645**  -5.355***  -3.922**  -1.985 
(2.010)  (0.892)  (2.350)  (1.457)  (1.575)  (1.211) 
Business Freedom  -0.117***  -0.191***  -0.063**  -0.072**  -0.066**  -0.037 
(0.024)  (0.038)  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.028) 
Tax Wedge on low wage 
earners, % (lagged 1 year) 
-0.684***  -0.801***  -0.541***  -0.611***  -0.517***  -0.400*** 
(0.093)  (0.032)  (0.163)  (0.067)  (0.087)  (0.108) 
MINWAGE:  minimum wage 
(% of average wage in industry 
& services) 
 
-0.609**  -1.849***  -0.661**  0.372***  0.253***  0.401** 
(0.246)  (0.107)  (0.311)  (0.072)  (0.094)  (0.170) 
MINWAGE*UNION_DENSITY            -0.013* 
          (0.007) 
UNION_DENSITY,  
% of employees 
0.074***  0.127***  0.045  0.058***  0.012  0.536* 
(0.022)  (0.006)  (0.049)  (0.020)  (0.029)  (0.279) 
NO_MINWAGE: the country 
does not have a minimum wage 
-0.165  -1.817***  -2.557  -2.764***  -1.353  -3.790* 
(0.452)  (0.343)  (2.353)  (1.059)  (1.759)  (2.295) 
lnGDP_ per_capita, PPP USD 
(annual average, lagged 1 year) 
-4.959  -3.085**  -1.254  4.108***  3.419***  5.169*** 
(3.275)  (1.473)  (6.094)  (1.058)  (1.293)  (1.382) 
IMMIGR* log_GDP per capita            -0.219** 
          (0.093) 
IMMIGR: Population with 
immigrant background, %  -0.310***  0.124***  -0.103  0.081*  0.060  1.950** 
  (0.077)  (0.046)  (0.132)  (0.046)  (0.072)  (0.859) 
Real GDP growth,  y-o-y, 
quarterly data lagged 1 quarter 
0.279***  0.286**  0.185**  0.092  0.131***  0.132*** 
(0.039)  (0.114)  (0.084)  (0.057)  (0.046)  (0.043) 
LMP_PASSIVE: Passive labor 
market measures spending, %  
GDP per percentage point of 
unemployment (lagged 1 yr) 
9.253**  28.345***  12.591*       
(4.368)  (0.755)  (7.748) 
     
UBSA (defined in Table 4), 
lagged 1 year 
-0.301***  -0.481***  -0.342***       
(0.047)  (0.053)  (0.104)       
Gini index  
(lagged 1 year) 
      0.262***  0.119   
      (0.068)  (0.116)   
Country-level random eff. s.d.      3.066      3.191 
   Residual s.d.      0.918      1.278 
LR test vs. a model without 
 random effects, p-value      0.0001      0.0000 
Root MSE  0.8500  1.2822  0.6209  2.1074  2.7608  0.9271 
R-squared  0.9788      0.8645     
# obs.   [# countries]  34   [12]  34   [12]  34   [12]  67  [27]  67  [27]  67  [27] 
Notes: [1] and [4] are Prais-Winsten regressions (See Davidson and MacKinnon (1993): 343-351) with country 
level heteroscedasticity and country-specific AR1 error correlation within panels. [2] and [5] are population-
averaged panel-data  models  with  semi-robust SE‘s clustered on countries (see  Zeger  et al., 1988); in these 
models, the estimates are obtained by averaging country-level random effects (possibly correlated with the Xs) 
across population.  [3] and [6] are mixed-effects  linear models with country-level random effects (possibly 
correlated with the Xs), see Section 2 and  Greene (2008: 233-238) for details.  Countries covered: For models 
[1] – [3], see Notes to Table 5. For models [4] – [6]: EU-27 (except for Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta), 
Norway, Russia, and Ukraine. *, **, ***  - estimates significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
 Sources: Dependent variables: Calculations with ESS data (see Table 1 for details). Explanatory variables - see 
Annex 1 (Table A1). Model estimates - own calculations.   46 
Table 7 Macro determinants of the shares of informal employees, 
informal self-employed, and unemployed (incl. discouraged) in the extended labor force. 
Europe, 2004-2009  








    (% of labor force extended to include discouraged workers) 
  Estimated coefficients (robust standard errors clustered on countries) 
  [1a]  [2a]  [1b]  [2b]  [1c]  [2c] 
Employment Protection 
Legislation Strictness, v. 2 
-2.673***  -2.887***  0.843  1.197  -1.120  -1.753*** 
(0.948)  (0.819)  (0.903)  (0.934)  (0.728)  (0.674) 
Government effectiveness 
([1b], [2b]: instrumented, see 
Annex 2 ) 
-5.059***  -5.676***  1.459  8.212*  -2.815***  -3.895** 
(1.901)  (2.153)  (3.068)  (4.881)  (1.369)  (1.706) 
Business Freedom  -0.075**  -0.086***  -0.148***  -0.109**  0.004  -0.070** 
(0.034)  (0.032)  (0.053)  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.032) 
Tax Wedge on low wage 
earners, % (lagged 1 year) 
-0.552***  -0.577***  -0.212***  -0.201**  -0.020  -0.138** 
(0.079)  (0.075)  (0.081)  (0.089)  (0.073)  (0.055) 
Minimum Wage (% of average 
wage in industry & services) 
 
0.354***  0.367**  0.253
(*
)  0.311  0.453***  0.587*** 
(0.095)  (0.168)  (0.160)  (0.257)  (0.088)  (0.156) 
NO_MINWAGE: the country 
does not have a minimum wage 
1.092  1.130  1.394  0.640  1.705  2.235 
(1.562)  (1.642)  (1.598)  (1.302)  (1.681)  (1.514) 
log GDP per capita, PPP USD 
(annual average, lagged 1 year) 
3.633***  3.221**  1.828  0.544  -1.519  -1.791 
(1.265)  (1.303)  (1.786)  (2.282)  (0.984)  (1.173) 
Real GDP growth,  y-o-y, 
quarterly data lagged 1 quarter 
0.114***  0.117*  0.067  0.119**  -0.145
(*
)  -0.226*** 
(0.050)  (0.060)  (0.076)  (0.064)  (0.089)  (0.060) 
LMP_ACTIVE: Active labor 
market measures spending, %  
GDP per percentage point of 
unemployment (lagged 1 yr) 
      -33.216***    -41.139*** 




LMP_PASSIVE: Defined in the 
same way as LMP_ACTIVE 
  6.522        19.365*** 
  (5.148)        (6.434) 
Union Density,  
% of employees 
0.016  0.012  -0.047**  -0.060*  -0.021  0.029 
(0.024)  (0.028)  (0.018)  (0.036)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
Population with Immigrant 
Background, % 
0.149***  0.185***  -0.176**  -0.348***  -0.087  0.039 
(0.050)  (0.057)  (0.074)  (0.118)  (0.063)  (0.064) 
Gini index  





)  0.292**  0.460***  0.200
(*
)  0.033 
(0.108)  (0.106)  (0.169)  (0.171)  (0.122)  (0.125) 
Root MSE  2.9717  3.1089  3.5521  3.3192  3.2598  2.8376 
R-squared  0.7384  0.7493  0.4693  0.5616  0.5912  0.7235 
# obs.   [# countries]  67   [27]  61   [25]  67   [27]  61   [25]  67   [27]  61   [25] 
Descriptive statistics on dependent variables 
Mean  5.45  5.40  9.53  9.90  10.23  10.13 
Std. Dev.  5.30  5.55  4.45  4.48  4.65  4.78 
Min  0.40  0.40  3.10  3.10  2.60  2.60 
Max  26.90  26.90  26.20  26.20  23.00  23.00 
Notes: Countries covered: Models [1a], [1b], [1c]: EU-27 (except for Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta), Norway, 
Russia, and Ukraine. Models [2a], [2b], [2c] exclude Russia, Ukraine and the 2004 observation on Slovenia.  
(*
),
 *, **, ***  - estimates significant at 11%, 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
Sources: Dependent variables: Calculations with ESS data (see Table 1 for details). Explanatory variables - see 
Annex 1 (Table A1). Model estimates - own calculations.    47 
  
Table 8 Tax wedge and implicit tax rate on labor income as determinants  
of proportion of population expecting some punishment (fine or prison)  
for a person whose undeclared economic activity is detected. 
20 EU countries, 2007 
  Estimated coefficients (robust standard errors) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Tax Wedge on low wage earners, %  
(lagged 1 year) 
a  0.923***  1.236***  1.127***       
(0.280)  (0.235)  (0.212)       
Implicit tax rate on labor income, % 
(lagged 1 year) 
a        1.432***  1.657***  1.362*** 
      (0.527)  (0.423)  (0.411) 
Employment Protection  
Legislation strictness, v. 2 
  -10.410***  -7.934***    -8.117*  -5.760
(*
) 
  (3.317)  (2.466)    (4.186)  (3.368) 
Rule of Law 
(lagged 1 year) 
a      11.160***      8.782** 
    (3.457)      (3.669) 
R-squared  0.2652  0.4013  0.6338  0.3580  0.4503  0.5823 
N  20  20  20  20  20  20 
Notes: See Annex 1 (Table A1) for details on explanatory variables. Constant terms are not reported.  
Countries covered: AT, BE, BG, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LV, NL, PL, PT, SE, SI, SK, UK.  
(*
),
 *, **, ***  - estimates significant at 11%, 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
Sources: Dependent variable: Riedmann and Fischer (2008), based on Special Eurobarometer 284. Explanatory 
variables - see Annex 1 (Table A1). Model estimates - own calculations. 
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Table 9 Effects of macro factors on informal employment and unemployment in Europe (2004-2009), by country group  
(Standardized coefficients from seemingly unrelated regressions with robust std. errors clustered on countries) 
  Employees without legal contract  Informal  self-employed  Unemployed and discouraged 
(y = % of labor force extended to include discouraged workers) 
  E & S  W & N
 d  EUR27  EUR25  E & S  W & N  EUR27
 d  EUR25
 d  E & S  W & N  EUR27  EUR25 
EPL_2  0.98***   4.00**  -1.36***  -1.53***  0.86*  -0.68**  0.41  0.65   0.13    2.70***  -0.57  -0.93*** 
GOV_EFFECT 
a  -3.17**  -1.62**  -3.70***  -3.31***  -0.03  -0.52**  1.07  4.80*  -2.34  -0.67  -2.06***  -2.27*** 
GOV_EXPsq/100            -1.56***        -1.11***     
INVEST_FREE  -3.05***        -5.65***          0.77       
TRADE_FREE  -0.68*        0.42        -1.30**       
BUS_FREE    -1.12**  -0.98**  -0.92***    -0.39***  -1.94***  -1.17**    -0.36   0.05  -0.75** 
TAX_WEDGE  
b    -6.81***  -3.66***  -3.93***    -0.66*  -1.40***  -1.37**    -1.05**  -0.13  -0.94** 
MIN_WAGE  2.73***  -4.50**   2.32***   1.50**  2.34***  0.47*   1.66
(*
)   1.27    3.46***  -2.17***   2.97***    2.40*** 
NO_MINWAGE     -2.47*   1.09   1.13    1.06***   1.39   0.64    -0.69   1.71    2.24 
logGDP_PC 
b  2.60**  -0.49   3.52***   2.51**  3.15***  -0.49**   1.77   0.42  -0.51  -3.26***  -1.47  -1.40 
GROWTH 
  0.77*   0.23   0.58***   0.58*  0.89***  0.17   0.34   0.58**  -0.64  -1.23***  -0.73
(*
)  -1.11*** 
UNION  -2.60***   1.96***  0.36   0.28  -4.24***  0.81***  -1.06**  -1.41*  -0.79    2.85***      0.69 
LMP_ACTIVE 
b            -0.53***    -2.80***    -1.92***    -3.47*** 
LMP_PASSIVE 
b     2.71***     0.82              2.14***     2.42*** 
UBSA 
b    -3.04***                     
GINI 




)       1.44**   2.12***       0.99
(*
)   0.15 
IMMIGR   1.57***  0.12  0.91***  1.17***  0.13  0.05  -1.07**  -2.20***  -0.94*    2.42***  -0.53   0.25 
Root MSE  2.05  1.51  2.97  3.11  2.99  0.87   3.27   3.09   3.66    1.77   3.26   2.84 
R-squared (OLS)   0.7867  0.8937  0.7384  0.7493  0.7895  0.8912  0.5490  0.6280   0.5234    0.8462   0.5912   0.7235 
N  [# countries]  35 [14]  34   [12]  67  [27]  61  [25]  35 [14]  34   [12]  67  [27]  61  [25]  35 [14]  34 [12]  67  [27]  61  [25] 
Table [model]  3 [2a]  5 [1a]  7 [1a]  7 [2a]  3 [2b]  5 [1b]  7 [1b]  7 [2b]  3 [2c]  5 [1b]  7 [1b]  7 [2b] 
Notes: Reported is change in y caused by a 1 std. deviation change in x. E, S, W, N – Eastern, Southern, Western and Northern Europe, respectively; EUR25 includes all EU27 
countries (except CY, MT, and LU), as well as NO; EUR27 (as well as E & S) includes also RU and UA; W & N includes CH (which is absent in EUR 27). IT (2006) and  LT(2009) 




 – variable is lagged 1 year in E & S (respectively, 
 all) models. 
 Non-standardized coefficients reported for dummy NO_MINWAGE.   
c Models in which GOV_EFFECT is instrumented (see Annex 2).
 (*
),
 *, **, ***  - estimates significant at 11%, 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  
See Annex 1 for details on the explanatory variables. Sources: Own calculation. 
 
   49 
 
Table 10 Signs of the effects of macro factors on the share of informal employment in the labor force, by country group and study 
Source  This study  Fialova and Schneider, 2011  Perry et al., 2007 
  Loayza et al. 2009 
 
Loayza/Rigolini  2006 
Dependent var. 
(% labor force)  




















Coverage  E&S  W&N  EUR  E&S  W&N  EUR  EUR17  EUR25  W&N&S  E  EUR25  W&N&S  E  World  World  World  DC 
# countries   14  12  27  14  12  27  17  25  16  9  25  16  9  60  60  70  57  42  18 
# obs  35  34  67  35  34  67  17  49  31  18  49  31  18  60  60  70  57  525  205 
EPL_2  +  +    +    0        0      
GOV_EFFECT  
a  
a    0 
a  
a           0 
a 
a    
GOV_EXPsq    ()
b                     0 
REG_QUAL               0  0  0    0       
CORR_CONTR                 0   0  
b 
b    
SAT_GOV    
b      
b                
RULE_LAW  
b      
b             
c 
c    
INVEST_FREE  
a      
a                  
TRADE_FREE  
a      0
a                  
BUS_FREE    
a      
a    0  0    0  0  0       
MON_FREE    
b      0 
b                
FIS_FREE                0          
TAX_WEDGE  + 
b      0 
b        0           
TAX_RATE  +
c,d                        
MIN_WAGE  +    +  +  +  + 
 
0  0  0   0  0  0       
NO_MINWAGE         +  0              
GDP_PC  +    +  +    0              
GROWTH  +  +  +  +  0  +              
UNION    +  +    +                
LMP_ACTIVE  
c          
a  0  0  0   0  0       
LMP_PASSIVE  
d  +  0 
a      
a  0  0  0   0  0       
UBSA                          
GINI  +
c,d    +      +         
d     
MINORITY  +
c,d                        
IMMIGR   +
a,b     +  0  0                
Notes: For the coverage, the following notation is used: E, S, W, N –Eastern, Southern, Western and Northern Europe, respectively;  EUR – Europe (countries as in Table 1, excl. 
Cyprus, Israel, and Switzerland); EUR17 – 11 „old Europe‖ countries and 6 NMS; EUR25 – same as EUR, excl. Russia and Ukraine; DC –developing countries. Explanatory 
variables: REG_QUAL  and CORR_CONTR  – indicators of Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption, respectively, from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (see Kaufmann 
et al. 2010; World Bank 2010); FIS_FREE (Fiscal Freedom) - the Heritage Foundation (2010) measure of the tax burden, which is inversely related to top tax rates and to tax 
revenue. Other variables – see Table A1. Loayza et al. and Loayza/Rigolini  use other versions of RULE_LAW and BUS_FREE;  Loayza et al. control also for average years of   50 
schooling and shares of youth and rural population. Shaded cells indicate results which might be spurious due to correlation between the variables involved. In each column, letters 
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Western and Northern Europe
Not included: Israel (EPL strictness 1.46, informal employees 25%)
Sources: Share of Informal Employees - calculation with ESS data
EPL strictness (version 2): OECD and Muravyev (2010)
.
in European countries, 2004-2009
Share of Informal Employees in the Labor Force vs. EPL Strictness
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Figure 2 Share of informal employees vs. minimum wage level 




























































Western and Northern Europe
Countries covered: EU-27 (except for Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus), Russia, and Ukraine
in European countries, 2003-2008
% of GDP per percentage point of unemployment
Spending on active and passive labor market measures
 
Figure 3 Spending on active and passive labor market measures 
   53 
Annex 1 Explanatory variables 
 
  Table A1. Explanatory variables used in the analysis – definitions and data sources 
Name  Abbreviation  Source 
c  Description  Scale 
Employment protection 
legislation strictness 
EPL_2  OECD and Muravyev 
(2010). 
Employment protection legislation index, 
version 2.  







GOV_EFFECT  World Governance 
Indicators (Kaufmann 
et al. 2010; World Bank 
2010) 
Captures perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies.  
 
 ‐2.5 to 2.5, 




Rule of Law  
b  RULE_LAW  World Governance 
Indicators (Kaufmann 
et al. 2010; World Bank 
2010) 
Captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
‐2.5 to 2.5, 
higher = better 
law enforcement 
 
Satisfaction with the 
Government  
SAT_GOV  European Social Survey 
(2002-2009), own 
calculation 
Average satisfaction with the national 
government 





GOV_EXPsq  Heritage Foundation 
(2010), own calculation 
Government expenditures (consumption 
and transfers) at all levels as percentage of 
GDP, squared /100. Recalculated from the 
Heritage Foundation (2010) Government 
Spending index: the latter equals  
100 – 3GOV_EXPsq 




 b  INVEST_FREE  Heritage Foundation 
(2010) 
Evaluates a variety of restrictions typically 
imposed on investment (labor market 
regulations are not included in this index). 
0 to 100, higher = 
less restrictions 
Trade Freedom  TRADE_FREE  Heritage Foundation 
(2010) 
A composite measure of the absence of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect 
imports and exports of goods and services 
0 to 100, higher = 
less barriers 
Business Freedom  BUS_FREE  Heritage Foundation 
(2010) 
Measures the ability to start, operate, and 
close a business 




a  MON_FREE  Heritage Foundation 
(2010) 
Measures  price  stability  and  absence  of 
price  controls;  negatively  related  to  the 
square  root  of  exponentially  weighted 
average inflation rate for the most recent 
three  years;  in  addition,  countries  with 
price controls are penalized. 
0 to 100, higher = 
lower inflation 
and less price 
controls 
Tax wedge for low wage 
earners 
a 
TAX_WEDGE  Eurostat and IZA 
database described by 
Lehmann and 
Muravyev (2009) 
Income tax on gross wage earnings plus the 
employee’s and the employer’s social 
security contributions, expressed as a 
percentage of the total labor costs of the 
earner, which include gross earnings plus 
the employer’s social security contributions 
plus payroll taxes (where applicable). 
0 to 100, higher =  
larger tax burden 
Implicit tax rate on 
labor 
a 
TAX_RATE  Eurostat  Total tax rate on labor computed as the 
ratio of total tax revenues of the category 
labor to a proxy of the potential tax base 
defined using the production and income 
accounts of the national accounts. 
0 to 100, higher =  
larger tax burden 
Notes: 
a Lagged 1 year in all specifications where used. 
b Lagged 1 year in some specifications.  
c In few cases, data on the closest available year  or interpolation have been used to fill missing data. Relevant 
related data have been analyzed in these cases to assure validity of the procedure. 
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Table A1.  Explanatory variables used in the analysis – definitions and data sources  
            (continued) 
Name  Abbreviation  Source 
c  Description  Scale 
Minimum wage level  MIN_WAGE0, 
MIN_WAGE 
Eurostat and own 
calculations with data 
of national statistical 
offices of Russia and 
Ukraine 
MIN_WAGE0:  Minimum  wage  level 
expressed as percentage of average wage in 
industry  and  services.  MIN_WAGE  assigns 
countries without a minimum wage sample 
mean  of  MIN_WAGE0  (in  addition,  a 
dummy NO_MINWAGE for these countries 
is included in the models). 
0 to 100 
No minimum wage  NO_MINWAGE  Eurostat  = 1 if a country does not have a minimum 
wage, 0 otherwise 
0 or 1 
Union density   UNION  Calculation with ESS 
data  
Trade union membership, share of all 
employees (%). 
0 to 100 
GDP per capita 
a  GDP_PC  World Bank  Logarithm of GDP per capita, purchasing 
power parities 
6.8 to 10.7 
GDP growth 
d  GROWTH  Eurostat, OECD, 
statistical offices of 
Russia and Ukraine, and 
own calculations 
Real year-on-year GDP growth (quarterly 
data), % 




IMMIGR  Calculation with ESS 
data 
First generation immigrants and second 
generation immigrants  
0 to 100 
Minority population  MINORITY  Calculation with ESS 
data 
Local born minority population without 
immigrant background, % 
0 to 100 
Gini index 
a  GINI  Eurostat and World 
Bank 
Gini index of income inequality  0 to 100 
Active labor market 
policy expenditure 
a 
LMP_ACTIVE  Calculation with OECD 
and Eurostat data 
Active labor market measures spending 
(categories 20-70), % GDP per percentage 
point of (LFS-based) unemployment 
0 to 1 
Passive labor market 
policy expenditure 
a 
LMP_PASSIVE  Calculation with OECD 
and Eurostat data 
Passive labor market measures spending 
(categories 80-90), % GDP per percentage 
point of (LFS-based) unemployment 
0 to 1 
Benefit net 




UBSA   OECD  Average unemployment benefit and social 
assistance net replacement rate over 60 
months of unemployment (%) 
0 to 100 
Notes: 
a Lagged 1 year in all specifications where used. 
b Lagged 1 year in some specifications.  
c In few cases, data on the closest available year  or interpolation have been used to fill missing data. Relevant 
related data have been analyzed in these cases to assure validity of the procedure. 
 

























Table A2. Descriptive statistics on explanatory variables 
  Eastern & Southern Europe  Western & Northern Europe  Europe (27 countries) 
  mean  s.d.  min  max  mean  s.d.  min  max  mean  s.d.  min  max 
EPL_2  2.38  0.47  1.74  3.36  2.06  0.52  1.10  2.89  2.27  0.51  1.10  3.36 
GOV_EFFECT
 a  0.66  0.59  -0.69  1.86  1.81  0.21  1.43  2.24  1.19  0.73  -0.69  2.24 
RULE_LAW
 a  0.55  0.65  -0.93  1.30  1.70  0.20  1.22  1.96  1.08  0.75  -0.93  1.96 
SAT_GOV  3.53  1.02  1.53  5.11  4.82  0.89  2.78  6.28  4.08  1.13  1.53  6.28 
GOV_EXPsq  17.14  4.81  7.13  26.93  22.75  6.21  11.37  32.60  21.50  1.90  7.13  32.60 
INVEST_FREE  62.29  16.82  30.00  90.00  77.65  13.50  50.00  90.00  69.85  17.28  30.00  90.00 
TRADE_FREE  79.29  9.08  44.20  86.60  83.14  2.62  79.80  87.20  81.24  6.95  44.20  86.60 
BUS_FREE  69.93  10.82  40.50  85.30  86.33  9.45  70.00  100.00  78.13  13.12  40.50  100.00 
MON_FREE
 a  77.66  5.42  62.80  85.70  85.16  2.61  80.50  90.00  81.25  5.48  62.80  89.90 
TAX_WEDGE 
a  38.49  3.90  31.00  46.70  38.10  9.17  16.10  50.00  38.86  6.62  16.10  50.00 
MIN_WAGE0  36.42  7.76  9.41  48.70  42.37  4.16  36.50  47.30  38.29  7.40  9.41  48.70 
MIN_WAGE  36.42  7.76  9.41  48.70  42.37  2.61  36.50  47.30  38.29  6.31  9.41  48.70 
NO_MINWAGE  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.59  0.50  0.00  1.00  0.27  0.45  0.00  1.00 
UNION  19.46  10.33  10.20  44.99  43.52  25.06  10.92  84.01  31.72  22.72  7.76  84.01 
GDP_PC 
a  8.68  0.78  6.83  9.70  10.26  0.17  10.04  10.64  9.42  0.97  6.83  10.64 
GROWTH 
b  3.09  5.99  -17.8  10.80  2.13  2.43  -7.40  7.70  2.26  5.07  -17.8  10.80 
IMMIGR  9.19  7.66  1.48  31.90  11.54  5.53  2.23  28.00  9.61  6.12  1.48  31.90 
MINORITY  10.74  8.18  1.85  37.99  2.81  2.05  0.42  7.74  7.02  7.18  0.42  37.99 
GINI 
a  31.46  5.56  22.00  43.70  27.35  3.05  23.40  34.60  29.62  4.93  22.00  43.70 
LMP_ACTIVE 
a  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.10  0.16  0.07  0.06  0.34  0.10  0.08  0.01  0.34 
LMP_PASSIVE 
a  0.06  0.05  0.02  0.19  0.23  0.12  0.03  0.49  0.15  0.13  0.02  0.49 
UBSA
 a  48.48  13.40  20.00  73.00  68.97  6.23  60.00  82.00  57.75  15.41  8.00  81.00 
TAX_RATE 
a  33.92  4.06  27.60  42.40  36.97  6.64  24.30  45.00  35.51  5.70  24.30  45.00 
# obs.    
[# countries] 
35 [14], 
 except for 
LMP_ACTIVE: 31 [13]; 
LMP_PASSIVE: 29 [ 12 ]; 
UBSA 27 [12 ]; GINI: 34 [14]; 
TAX_RATE 30 [12] 
34 [12],  
 except for 
 
MIN_WAGE0: 14 [5]; 
GINI: 31 [11]; 
TAX_RATE 31 [11] 
67 [27],  except for 
MIN_WAGE0: 49 [20]; 
LMP_ACTIVE: 63 [26]; 
LMP_PASSIVE: 61 [25 ]; 
UBSA 59 [25 ];  
TAX_RATE 30 [12] 
Estimation sample  Table 3A, all columns; 
Table 4, columns [2]-[5] 
Table 5, all columns; 
          Table 6, columns [1]-[3] 
        Table 6, columns [4]-[6]; 
        Table 7, cols. [1a], [1b], [1c] 
Notes: Countries covered: Eastern & Southern Europe
 – see Notes to Table 3A; Western & Northern Europe  – 
see Notes to Table 5; Europe (27 countries) – EU-27 (except for Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta), Norway, 
Russia, and Ukraine.  
 a Lagged 1 year.  
b Lagged 1 quarter.  
Sources: Calculation with data described in Table A1. 
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Annex 2 Instrumental variables and exogeneity tests 
 
All models reported in this paper include one of the variables meant to measure the quality of 
governance  and  of  public  goods  in  general  -  Government  Effectiveness,  Rule  of  Law  or 
Satisfaction  with  the  Government  (see  Table  A1  for  details).  Plausibly,  same  unobserved 
factors might affect both the (actual and perceived) quality of governance and the level of 
informal employment in a country.  An instrumental-variable approach is used to address this 
potential endogeneity in each of the equations of the seemingly unrelated models reported in 
Tables 3, 5, and 7. Each of the tables reports two specifications of equations modeling the 
levels of informal dependent employment, informal self-employment, and unemployment in 
three country groups. Thus, we have 18 equations to test.   
  As instruments we use indicators based on three questions from the same round of ESS 
survey. These questions ask the respondent to evaluate, at a 0-to-10 scale, (i) Trust in the 
police (POLICE); (ii) Satisfaction with the state of healthcare in the country (HEALTH); (iii) 
Statement „Most people try to be fair‖ (FAIRNESS). For each of these variables, we have tried 
(on  each  of  the  equations)  the  mean,  the  median  and  the  25th  percentile,  altogether  9 
instruments. In theory, the first two variables can influence tax morale, but for 13 cases we 
could  not  reject  the  hypothesis  of  zero  correlation  between  country-median  (9  cases)  or 
country-mean  (4  cases)  trust  in  the  police  and  the  disturbances  in  the  informality  (or 
unemployment) equations. In remaining cases we have used mean HEALTH (twice), mean 
FAIRNESS,  the  25
th  percentile  of  FAIRNESS,  and,  in  one  case,  combination  of  the 
DURATION  of  ESS  field  work  (in  months)  with  the  share  of  local  born  MINORITY 
population.  In most cases, just one of the instruments appeared as convincingly valid and not 
weak, with one or few more in the grey zone.  There have been no cases when different 
instruments  provided  conflicting  evidence.  The  rationale  for  using  different  distribution 
parameters is as follows:  the causal link (if any) between [dis]trust in the police and informal 
employment is likely to be rooted in the lower part of the trust distribution, thus affecting the 
25
th percentile and the mean but not the median.  On the other hand, the 25
th percentile of 
FAIRNESS  (and  hence  it‘s  mean  as  well)  likely  correlates  with  perceived  government 
effectiveness, but not necessarily with the unobserved drivers of informality.  
  Table A3 reports the details of the tests. Exogeneity of the suspected variables is not 
rejected, with high enough p-values, in all but four cases (for which instrumented estimates 
are presented in Tables 5, 7). The whole set of instruments is never weak, as seen from first 
stage F-tests (see Greene, 2008: 350), but weak identification cannot be ruled out firmly in 
some cases. However, instrument validity tests by Anderson-Rubin (see Greene, 2008: 378-
379) and Stock and Wright (2000) are weak-instrument-robust.    57 
Table A2 Exogeneity tests 
  Eastern and Southern Europe (Table 3A) 












Model   [1a]  [1b]  [1c]  [2a]  [2b]  [2c] 
Suspected variable  Rule of Law  Government Effectiveness (lagged 1 year) 
Exogeneity test (p-value)  0.3388  0.4147  0.6729  0.7107  0.2810  0.4801 












F-test, first stage   212.43  212.43  212.43  165.68  1318.81  165.68 
F test of excluded instruments  3.40  3.40  3.40  4.87  23.51  4.87 
 Prob > F  0.0881  0.0881  0.0881  0.0460  0.0003  0.0460 
Underidentification test (p-value)           
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
 test  0.0948  0.0948  0.0948  0.0489  0.0082  0.0489 
Instrument validity (p-value)             
Anderson-Rubin Wald F
test 
  0.2105  0.8846  0.6150  0.6769  0.4364  0.4941 
Stock-Wright LM S stat., P> 
   0.1574  0.8627  0.5497  0.6135  0.3592  0.4078 
# clusters/obs/regressors  14/35/9  14/35/9  14/35/9  14/35/11  14/35/11  14/35/11 
  Western and Northern Europe (Table 5) 








self-empl.  Unemployed  
Model   [1a]  [1b]  [1c]  [2a]  [2b]  [2c] 
Suspected variable  Government Effectiveness  Satisfaction with the Government 
Exogeneity test (p-value)  0.0161  0.2962  0.7643  0.8199  0.5518  0.0197 












F-test, first stage   12.85  60.21  30.40  16.52  17.52  36.45 
F test of excluded instruments  5.20  3.03  3.53  3.49  4.69  9.72 
 Prob > F  0.0257  0.1096  0.0872  0.0884  0.0532  0.0098 
Underidentification test (p-value)           
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
 test  0.0709  0.0279  0.0392  0.0649  0.0483  0.0125 
Instrument validity (p-value)             
Anderson-Rubin Wald F
test 
  0.5413  0.5872  0.9398  0.3656  0.4312  0.6829 
Stock-Wright LM S stat., P> 
   0.4669  0.5307  0.9182  0.2569  0.297  0.5469 
# clusters/obs/regressors  12/34/10  12/34/8  12/34/9  12/34/10  12/34/9  12/34/10 
  Europe (Table 7) 








self-empl.  Unemployed  
Model   [1a]  [1b]  [1c]  [2a]  [2b]  [2c] 
Suspected variable  Government Effectiveness  Government Effectiveness 
Exogeneity test (p-value)  0.7959  0.0222  0.5516  0.6888  0.0267  0.8181 












F-test, first stage   80.49  80.49  80.49  61.57  135.07  72.96 
F-test of excluded instruments  11.91  11.91  11.91  2.81  1.83  15.38 
 Prob > F  0.0019  0.0019  0.0019  0.1065  0.1884  0.0006 
Underidentification test (p-value)           
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
 test  0.0081  0.0081  0.0081  0.1670  0.1819  0.0118 
Instrument validity (p-value)             
Anderson-Rubin Wald F
test 
  0.2749  0.6677  0.2411  0.3559  0.2265  0.2870 
Stock-Wright LM S stat., P> 
   0.2315  0.6375  0.2002  0.3497  0.1594  0.1747 
# clusters/obs/regressors  27/67/12  27/67/12  27/67/12  25/61/13  25/61/13  25/61/13 
Notes: All statistics are country-cluster robust and het-robust. All models are exactly identified, except for Table 
5: [1a], where overidentification test‘s p-value P(Hansen J > 
(1)
 0.6050 In all models, F-statistics of 
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) Wald rank test for weak identification equals that from F-test of excluded instruments.  
# regressors excludes constant and (for Table 5) partialled out variables.  Source: Calculation with ESS data. 